On the Strong Version of the Principle

Although I agree with Singer’s argument that “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (235), I disagree with his stance on how much we ought to give. Singer offers two methods by which to carry out our moral duty. The moderate one asks that we do what we can, up to the point where we must “sacrifice something morally significant,” while the strong one “require[s] us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, [which] … require[s] reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility” (241). Singer defines this level of marginal utility as “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift” (241). He declares that the moderate version is inferior to the strong version, which is the correct one, although achieving it “would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee” (241). Here is my issue: If we were to follow Singer’s recommended strong version of the principle and become as destitute as the Bengali refugees, what would become of us (229)?

Throughout the article, Singer remarks on how few affluent people are willing to help the less fortunate for the sake of charity, which is more or less considered an optional good in our culture (235). If one does decide to give, already exceeding the moral expectations of society, one has little motivation to give a considerable amount, since a gift of any size is welcomed with gratitude, and as such will typically not do so (237). Hence, it seems that one in need cannot rely on the aid of others and must, if one can, do what is necessary to take care of oneself. By this, I do not mean that one should not give aid to the less fortunate (I have agreed to Singer’s initial argument, as mentioned above), but that one should not give to the extent that Singer holds to be correct, namely that determined by the strong version of the principle. From my understanding on Singer’s article, it would not be correct for someone to have more money in the bank than is needed to satisfy basic physiological requirements; to bolster this argument, Singer quotes Thomas Aquinas, who wrote: “Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance” (qtd. in Singer, 239). However, it is logical to think ahead. Who knows what medical emergency there might be, whether one will have a steady job, or whether one will be paid enough to live in a country where the cost of living is on the rise? Because the future is uncertain, it is wise to prepare for what might happen. Following the strong version of the principle is too great a sacrifice and risk to take.