Human Rights and an Analogy

Often, Hursthouse brings up the matter of the woman’s rights with respect to aborting the child she bears; however, he ignores the rights of the developing child. This is a huge flaw, since abortion is not just about the biological parents and what say they have in the matter. It is greatly important to recognize that the fetus, a developing human being, merits the rights of any human. This includes the right to life. If Hursthouse is to say that abortion is still appropriate in certain circumstances, then he is proponing the infringement of the developing child’s rights and also supporting his/her murder. He may instead argue that the fetus does not obtain his rights until a certain stage of the pregnancy, in which case abortion prior to that stage would not be infringing on any rights, as they would not yet have been dealt. However, he could not say that either, since he already argued that “the status of the fetus… is, according to virtue theory, simply not relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion” (236). On the matter of virtue theory, I believe that honoring the right to life that a fetus has, beginning at conception, is in line with the Aristotelian action of giving to others their due, the virtue of which is justice. Thus, virtue theory would not support abortion.

Another matter I would like to mention is that of a fallacy of false analogy. Hursthouse makes a comparison between deliberate abortion and natural abortion, or miscarriage. He argues for consistency – that if someone thinks abortion is the act of killing something of no importance or is the exercise of one’s rights, then one should hold the same view towards miscarriage. Thus, one ought to think a miscarriage is no big deal, like a botched haircut (238). For a person who holds the opinion that an abortion is no pressing matter, s/he would not be wrong to also feel pity for the woman who suffers a miscarriage. The difference between a deliberate abortion and a natural abortion is that miscarriages are typically unintentional. Thus, the loss of the developing child should warrant pity, because the mother desired to have the child. Abortions are usually undergone in cases where the child is not desired. Thus, a person who feels no pity over the loss of an unwanted thing can rationally pity someone who has lost a desired thing.

Cultural Relativism

`           A common objection to virtue ethics is that different cultures have different ideologies of what moral virtue is more significant than another. Some even have moral virtues that are conflicting among a specific culture. As an example of this, Greeks think that the virtue of pride, which is an appropriate behavior of winning honors, is the utmost important virtue. On the other hand, Christian monks think that humility is the most important virtue, which is humbleness in winning honors. Both of these virtues align in the same category but both cultures think to act differently. In Aristotle’s reading the diagram of virtue as a mean shows us that pride is the “correct virtue” and excessive humility is referred to as a vice of deficiency (384-387). Hursthorne discusses how cultural relativism could appear to be as a challenge.

            There’s a counter argument to be looked at for this objection. I recall in Socrates Metaethical Issues how it discussed that even though cultures are different; they still have a common underlying basis (14). It explained a sport analogy in how all sports are different yet they have common underlying principles (14). I think the same could be said with different cultures and their virtues. If a culture could testify why a certain virtue is sacred to them and proves that it shows high moral standards, then I don’t think it should be such a conflicting problem. If the reasoning behind their values makes sense, we should respect it. Even though all cultures are different, we all aim to act virtuously in our own practices. This could relate back to the sports analogy; different sports (cultures) have different rules (virtues), but in the end we all aim for the same goal to win under the same common basic principles (prosper and act virtuously within our own cultures). 

Blog post #6

Post to the blog EITHER:
   (a) on Hursthouse (available here) by Wednesday at 11:00 PM; OR
   (b) on Marquis/Thomson (now available on the S-drive) by Monday at 11:00 PM.
The content of your post should be either:
   (I) An argument against something in the material; OR
   (II) An argument for something in the material.

Clarification of Kant

4:427-429

Immanuel Kant defines the parameters that define moral value in an objective way. He starts off by explaining the definition of will is having the ability and enforcing oneself to do something which is solely based on certain laws. This capability of a will is only found in rational beings. I hope to simplify and clarify the difference that Kant expresses between subjective and objective ends. When actions are the end and are actions that have to be done regardless of the outcomes then they have an objective value to them. Kant then states that when actions are subjective, they usually have a desire associated with it and rewards are expected. When one looks for a reward at the end of his or her action the action then becomes relative because only their sense of desire makes the action contain any worth. This means that these actions do not necessarily have to be forced upon every single rational being.

Kant then goes on to say that the mere existence of rational beings is the end. Every rational being is the end of which our action is done. Kant thinks that there is absolute worth in these beings which requires one in an objective way to respect that being. Since every rational being like oneself is an end then each person must be treated in that objective way. This means that each person should not respect simply as a means of gaining something but rather as a moral duty. The Bhagavad Gita has a similar view that “motive should never be in the fruits of the action” (Chapter 2 Verse 47). 

The Moral Happy Helper

Kant relies a lot on people agreeing with him in the fact that actions are only truly moral if they are done without any other ulterior motive. However, when the example of the happy helper was brought up in class I could not help myself in disagreeing with the point of the example. A brief refresher of the case is that there is a person who really enjoys helping people and thus does it, but in an alternate case, this same person does not enjoy helping people anymore but now  instead helps people out of duty. Kant claims that it is a generally accepted view that actions are not truly moral unless they are done purely out of duty and with no ulterior motives  behind these actions. I did not agree with this statement. I feel that although I may have ulterior motives,like happiness, behind a "good" action I perform does not take away from its moral goodness. Unless my ulterior motive is something harmful or false, I do not believe that any moral value should be taken away from me. The example of the happy helper I can twist to show my point. The happy helper is no longer happy helping people but still does it just because they feel like they have to. How does that add moral value to their helping? Just  because they  may be sacrificing a little more since they do not enjoy it? I think that it would be ridiculous to tell someone that enjoys helping people that they are immoral since we will never be able to  truly know if they are helping to help or their own pleasure is their only motive. When talking this out with my friend we discussed how we agree you will never know what someone's true ulterior motive is, but we believe that that is on them. Morality doesn't come from what other people deem your actions, but from yourself.

What is Kant trying to say?

In this blog post, I will attempt to clarify what Kant is trying to say in a part of the reading section assigned. Particularly, I want to focus on hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Kant defines imperative in this way; “The representation of an objective principle in so far as it is necessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called imperative” (Kant, 27). What I believe he is trying to say here and in the paragraphs following it, have something to do with connecting the objective code of morality/reason with the subjective nature of human will and consciousness. For example, the laws of gravity operate in such a way that I cannot disobey them if I will myself to. I will fall to the ground no matter how much concentration I put towards levitating off the ground. Laws of reason operate in a different manner in that I can subjectively choose to obey or not obey them based upon my will. Imperative is basically a term defines the connection between the will I possess and the objective law I can choose to follow or not follow. Kant separates imperatives into two different categories; Hypothetical and Categorical. Hypothetical imperatives can be viewed similarly to instrumental goods or evils. Instrumental goods are things that lead to pleasure, but are not necessarily pleasurable in and of themselves. In a similar fashion, a hypothetical imperative is a command (as he puts it) for some action that is done to indirectly attain some higher object or purpose. Categorical imperatives on the other hand are commands for actions that are necessary on their own accord, or in in and of themselves. This is what I could dig up from this particular part of his reading. 

Blog 5

In the second section, Kant says,  “though much may be done that conforms with what duty commands, still it is always doubtful whether it is actually done from duty and thus has a moral worth”. Here, Kant is suggesting that it is difficult to determine the true motive of an action and therefore, it is challenging to discriminate between pure moral intention and “self-love” (selfish) intentions. Kant says that people “gladly flatter ourselves [themselves] with the false presumption of a nobler motive”.  I completely agree with this assertion. There are so many incidences where one can ask if a person did something because of moral duty or selfishness because they do not want to be negatively sanctioned by society. For example, does one not cheat on a test because of moral obligation (duty) or because they do not want to get caught and reprimanded? Kant is right, that there is no way to truly discriminate between intentions because selfish intentions can hide under the guise of moral obligation. Therefore, because one cannot identify incidences of pure morality with certainty in any situation, experience cannot be a reliable source of moral definition.  Kant says, “pure sincerity in friendship can no less be required of everyone even if up to now there had never been a sincere friend; because this duty as a duty as such, prior to all experience, lies in the idea of a reason determining the will by a priori grounds”. In lame man’s terms, this essentially means that you do not need to have a good friend in order to be a good friend.  Kant uses God as another example to make his point.  He says that God, our “ideal of moral perfection”, is did not originate from experience. 

Kant's Abstract Ideas About Morality

Kant is transparent in conveying to his readers that his concern is with “moral worth” and acting from “pure duty” (4:406).  I am interested in intent, and find that good intentions often result in positive action, but Kant does not take into account well enough the idea of misguided action carried out by a good will.  Kant is very adamant about determining a good will, but leaves a very abstract interpretation of what ways we can carry out our good will.

Kant establishes that there is a difference between the hypothetical and the categorical by noting that the former imperative assumes action is good when there is actual purpose, whereas the latter is reason driven action, or “action is represented as good in itself”  (4:414-15).  I find it idealistic and frustrating to assume that action backed by pure will is all that is important.  The consequence and result of an action matters a great deal.  Though some do not have the means to providing change, it is impractical to assume that change will come simply by willing it to happen.  

Kant tries to distinguish that knowing what causes happiness requires experience and argue that morality cannot be determined in the same way (4:418).  Instead, he says morality is categorical and unconditional (4:419), and moral duty should be treated as “practical unconditional necessity of action” (4:425). Though it would be positive to be able to follow a moral code that does not change, I think that realistically, our sense of morality is highly empirical.  I find myself on a regular basis revising my moral code, and my behavior in ordinance with that moral code.  I learn about the world and the ways people act and respond to what is happening, and my beliefs change.  I do not find beliefs and morality synonymous, but I do find myself zeroing in on a sharper sense of where my moral standards lie.  Experience is a crucial part of that understanding, and the abstract nature of Kant’s argument, and his refusal to acknowledge that experience influences how we react to uphold our moral standards is confusing.

I reacted negatively when Kant admitted that his concern was more with intent, and less with results, “what ought to happen, even if it never does” (4:427).  He dips his toes in the idea that happiness is important to people, and how we create a compromise between our good will and selfishness, but comes to the conclusion that “we do not need to investigate the grounds of why something pleases or displeases” (4:427).  I was again frustrated with the idea that Kant is so abstract that he heavily ignores consequences.  After reading Mill, I find this not only difficult to follow and to apply to all situations.  I also find it less defensible than Mill’s appeal to consequence.  We often act based on consequence, which is hard to expect people to change.

Blog 5

In the second section of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, the author explains that it is impossible that “the concepts of duty have to be drawn solely from experience” (4:407). When first reading this, I was a bit confused. I thought that as a person, we cannot just forget or let go of past experiences so they don’t affect us. In fact, some scientist believe every experience a person has gone through attributes greatly to their behavior and what they chose to do, much like a predictable linear regression model. Even if a person tries their hardest to let go of previous experiences, there is still lingering biases that not even that person can control. With that all being said, I thought that there is no way we can derive the meanings of duty without influencing them personally. However, after re-reading the text (several times) I became to realize that true moral duty is how Kant describes, easily conformable to do as humans. The author notes that in most cases it is “doubtful whether it is actually done from duty, thus (having) a moral worth” (4:406).

I soon realize that this is why in order to create a universal moral law, humans must create it from priori, or knowledge independent of experience.  Kant notes how every individual’s entire viewpoint on life is personalized and varies from one being to another. I anticipate that it is these inconsistencies and individualism that creates these personal biases in all of us, therefore making it seemingly impossible to create true moral duty. I believe all of this is why Kant wants us to derive moral codes and laws without those influences. Without these biases and experiences, moral code can now be applicable universally and as true moral duty without any outside influence.

Being good at being self-interested

            In his examples of principles that cannot be categorical imperatives such as the suicide and borrowing money cases, Kant shows that it would be inconsistent for a person to expect certain things of others while making exceptions for himself.  Through this method of thinking, rules like “don’t lie”, “repay your debts”, and other basic types of ethics rules seem to follow.  While this is very appealing, I think it still might be possible to will certain rules and principles with which Kant would be unhappy to become universal laws.

            For example, Kant tries to show that being solely self-interested is inconsistent.  However, I don’t think Kant considers the subtleties that a person who is good at being self-interested would consider.  In his fourth case, Kant says that a person cannot will that the principle of not helping others and being solely self-interested is inconsistent because such a person may one day need help also.  A smart self-interested person, however, would help others because of reciprocity.  We could look at evolution as a model; despite the fact that genes are “self-interested” in order to be passed down through generations, altruistic behavior is still seen in nature.  This is because an organism that carries out altruistic actions will generally also be the recipient of altruistic actions, increasing the reproductive fitness of the organism and resulting in a passing down of the genes.  Similarly, a smart self-interested person would consider the amount of time invested into helping other people and the return and benefit in terms of self-interest.  Of course, one would be unable to expect help outside of these types of contractual-help relationships such a universal law would engender, but some help can still be anticipated without being inconsistent.

            Therefore, a maxim such as “be solely self-interested” could be willed as a universal law without resulting in a total breakdown of promise-making, helping others, etc. and without becoming unable to expect any help at all from others if it were universally applied.  Thus, I do not think that considering whether a principle would be self-contradictory if applied universally necessarily leads to the types of moral laws or the types of motivations for doing moral actions that Kant wants.

Universal Laws of Nature

Kant posits that a guideline for moral imperatives of duty is to imagine as though your actions would produce universal laws of nature. If your actions would produce non-contradictory laws of nature, you're fine with respect to your duties. If your actions, when extrapolated to all of nature, produce self-contradictory situations, they ain't dutiful. Kant offers a few examples, the first of which states that a person considering suicide for the reason that any further protraction of it promises more ill than good ought not to commit suicide, as following this universal law would cause a contradictory state in which the same impulse that encouraged the advancement of life may also situationally encourage life to end itself. This outcome to me does not seem in itself contradictory. If the impulse produces two different outcomes given two different situations, or an outcome which contradicted itself, I would say that was an untenable law. But Kant's objection seems to be that the law is untenable because it could produce two different outcomes (advance or destroy life) in two different situations (life promises more good than ill; life promises more ill than good). Barring a misinterpretation of Kant's example, I do not see how this is in itself contradictory. To state it another way, Kant's objection is that if the impulse which compels life is pleasure, that same impulse cannot also compel the destruction of life. But it seems to me that if the reason we live is for the sake of pleasure, then lacking a positive outlook on pleasure it is perfectly rational to end one's life. The law does not appear to be contradictory to me.

We are ends to ourselves

First off, I am going to say I agree to this statement and try to make sense of what is said in these examples. In chapter 2, several examples were brought up between 4:422 - 4:423 explaining ones actions and why we would do them. We want to "be able to will that a maxim of our action becomes universal law" (4:424), meaning act in a way that would establish the maxim for the action as a universal law of nature.

An end we try to pursue can be done falsely (not purely) and be done purely if it is done only to itself and have no other purposes. The first example of suicide was first questioned. We "ask [ourselves] whether [the] action can be consistent with the idea of humanity, as an end in itself" (4:429) and we reach the conclusion yes it is. One would normally commit suicide to avoid the displeasure of whatever insurmountable situation he is in. He uses his person as a means to an end being his life.

We continue to the next example of borrowing. This is when we can use other humans and an end, but not include ourselves in the end. To "make a lying promise to others will see at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, who does not at the same times contain in himself the end" (4:429). I like how clever the statement is holding up. Our end in this situation is to not have to pay back the person, making a lying promise, and this would include keeping us out of the end. So in the end, they will use that person to help themselves financially, motivating us to continue this longer and becoming a universal law.

The third example is explained simply, our "contingent duty to oneself it is not enough that the action not conflict with humanity in our person, as an end in itself ,it must also harmonize with it" (4:430). I took this as our duty cannot hinder humanity, so we actually have to benefit humanity, to harmonize with it. Humanity itself pushes for greater perfection, we try to help each other without hindering and try to preserve humanity as an end, but to not make advancements to this end.

Lastly, we as humans have a duty to help each other. We have a "natural end that all human beings have is their own happiness" (4:430). It is said that humans can exist if we choose not to contribute to one's happiness, their need to be helped, as long as we do not make their situation worse. This does not bode well with our duty to help others because "this is still only a negative and not a positive agreement with humanity, as an end in itself" (4:430). We are not trying to help each other advance to our own ends.

The wording was confusing, but I think I got the gist of what was being said. Those four examples were explained well enough for me to agree to the statement that humans are an end to themselves. We just need to examine situations more clearly and we can eventually make an conclusion that we do this for this and to reach this end. Now, whether the action is good or not is yet to be seen until further examination, but for now the statement seems to hold up well, compared to the four examples.

Interfering with Rational Autonomy

To Kant, treating a human as a means to advance one's own end is the worst moral wrong one could do. He believes this because he sees human rationality as an intrinsic good, and therefore the ability to guide's one's own life, with a free will and complete autonomy is morally good. However, is this always true? In certain situations it may seem strange or awkward to follow this imperative, and we would sacrifice a lot more than what we would gain.

Suppose a serial killer only murders people with names that begin with the letter A (you do not fit in this category). Your roommate Adam is hiding in the closet and the serial killer is knocking on your door, asking if Adam is home. If you tell him the truth he will barge into the room and look for Adam. If you lie to him there is sufficient reason to believe he will walk away to search for your roommate somewhere else. Under Kantian view, you are obligated to tell the serial killer the truth, because doing so otherwise would be to manipulate his rational autonomy (assuming he is rational).

One may point out that since the serial killer's autonomy would guide him to obstruct someone else's (Adam) autonomy more severely you are allowed to lie to the serial killer. However on a pure Kantian view this argument may not hold because the simple action of obstructing someone else's autonomy constitutes a violation of their rights, and moral restrictions are placed, not allowing the actor to move any further regardless of the consequences.

Another option would be to completely redefine who has a rational autonomy and somehow exclude the serial killer, or discount him as having autonomy because he wishes to interfere with the autonomy of others. Now, since he does not count as having an authentic autonomy the actor is permitted to lie to him. However this seems somehow strange, because it gives the impression that we can forsake our humanity. Normally when we invoke the idea of what makes us human we think of many things, with rights being one of them. Rights are given to us as birthright and only in rare circumstances can we give them up. This then brings up the question can we give up our right not to be manipulated? However, murder and being lied to both constitute as forms of manipulation against our will, so how can they be differentiated?

imperatives of skill

Kant talks about “imperatives of skill” in the second paragraph of 4:415, and says that “parents principally seek to have their children learn ever so many kinds of things, and take care to develop skill in the use of means to all sorts of discretionary ends.” In this paragraph, he says that skill is not related to a rational and good end. However, it is important to learn skill, because no one knows what will happen in one’s life. The more skills one has, the more likely one can come to an end that is rational and good.

This supports the idea of a liberal art college education (Ursinus College) and I agree with his idea. At Ursinus College, students have to take classes for core requirements, even though it may seems unrelated to future careers or what we are interested in. However, even though you may enter college with a career goal, it may change anytime, especially when one’s mind opens up by learning something new. This may lead to more happiness in one’s life by actually allowing an individual to do what he or she wants to do, not what one believed prior to learning. Moreover, learning things in classes are not only for career goals, but also to enrich one’s life. You never know what knowledge will be useful in your life, therefore the more knowledge you have, the better off you are. Since skills can lead to both good and bad end, one may be able to make better judgments about how to use one’s skill by having more knowledge.  

Why We Do What We Do

In Kant’s Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Section 2, after discussing the reasons behind will, he brings up two imperatives: Hypothetical Imperative and the Categorical Imperative. These imperatives are guidelines, or instructions in life.

The Hypothetical Imperative, like its namesake, is dependent on the hypothetical situation. The Hypothetical Imperative tells us the standard means to achieve something. Once an objective or goal is set, it is clear what needs to be done for that specific goal to be achieved. For example, in order to do well in school, one must study hard. It is based on a situation, and fairly straightforward.

The Categorical Imperative on the other hand, is more of a universal law. It tells us what we should be doing, regardless of what our goals and desires are. Unlike the Hypothetical Imperative, the Categorical Imperative does not include circumstantial considerations. It is a rule or a law that applies to everyone. Kant describes the Categorical Imperative as that one should act only in such a way that you could want the motivating principle of your action to become a universal law of nature. Examples of the Categorical Imperative would be, not to commit suicide, or not to steal.

Some of the differences between the Categorical Imperative and the Hypothetical Imperative include the reasoning behind why people act the way they do. For the Hypothetical Imperative, people follow certain rules or guidelines because they know that it will help them achieve their respective objectives, and is entirely circumstantial. The Categorical Imperative comes into play when people act a certain way with no real reason for doing so (not stealing etc.) simply because it is the universal law. The Categorical Imperative is presupposed by experience, or a priori, and not by circumstances. Another difference is morality. The Categorical Imperative is centered around morality, whereas the Hypothetical Imperative is just a means to achieve a goal. If a certain goal does not apply to another person, it gives that other person no reason to follow that particular hypothetical imperative. The Categorical Imperative is something everyone follows.

Kant - Second Section

“We then gladly flatter ourselves with the false presumption of a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives, because when moral worth is at issue what counts is not the actions, which one sees, but their inner principles, which one does not see” (4:408).  Just because someone is helping out somewhere like a soup kitchen doesn’t mean they are doing it for the right reasons.  If you are just doing it because you have to and find it to be pointless otherwise then you are not doing what is morally right.  Someone else who is helping in a soup kitchen could be doing it so they can help those who are in need and can’t afford their own food, this would be morally right.  The difference between these two people is the fact that one is just there because they have to be and aren’t seeing how this is actually helping other but is just waiting and wondering when it is time for him/her to leave while the person who is doing it to actually make a difference in someone’s life cares about what they are doing and is truly doing what is right.  You should never do something you don’t really want to do because in the end you aren’t really helping anyone.  Don’t just go help out somewhere because your friend is and you feel bad not doing the same, if your heart is not in it then it isn’t worth it for anyone, not those you are supposed to be helping or yourself.       

On Treating Each Other as Ends

In the middle of Section II, Kant states, "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely is a means" (4:429). I want to both clarify what Kant says in these couple of pages (4:428-4:429) and offer a criticism of this law.

In these pages, Kant distinguishes between objects (specifically things) and people and between subjective ends and objective ends. The importance of Kant marking the difference between things in people is that we are rational beings, and our ability to reason is natures way of marking us as something not meant to be used as a means. Rational beings are subsequently, "an object of respect"; all rational beings must respect every other rational being by treating them as ends. Furthermore, for Kant, it is not enough to say that rational beings must be respect as subjective ends as that undermines the "absolute worth" of rational beings. To treat someone as a subjective end means merely that it has worth for you, but respecting a rational being as rational is more fundamental for Kant than just having subjective worth for you. Hence, Kant argues, we must treat rational beings as objective ends because rational beings' existence has absolute value; value that relies solely on its existence. Kant's point is that if we are to properly respect rational beings, we must respect them as objective ends (as ends in themselves) or else we undermine the absolute worth of rationality in beings. 

Thus Kant arrives at the conclusion that we must treat everybody, including ourselves, as an ends in themselves. Kant uses three examples to show how this could be a powerful and successful moral guide. While this is a very attractive, egalitarian, and noble law, Kant does not do a very good job of actually telling us what treating someone as an end in themselves would look like. All three of his examples merely show how treating someone as a means would violate his law, but they do not tell us what treating someone as an objective end would actually look like. Do I not ask people for anything? Do I love everybody as I love a family member? Is it even possible for me to treat someone as an end in this way? What is the proper way to respect rationality? Let everyone do what they want, so long as what they want seems to fit in with the other maxims we create? My point is that I cannot imagine what it would look like and Kant does not paint a very clear picture about what it should look like. Kant seems willing to say that the Kingdom of Ends is more an ideal than necessarily a completely real possibility, but he does not seem as keen to say the same for treating people as ends. Clearly Kant has a picture about how to treat someone as an end, but he never really shows us what that is.

Reason: Meaning

          In the second section (4:407-4:408) I found most interesting the very beginning where is talks about experience, and this helped me understand my blog post from a previous posting as well. Kant talks about experience versus reason as the foundation of morality. I tried to rewrite Kant’s words in a more simplified way to find out the meaning of this passage and it was written as the following:

It is impossible to believe that with experience one can know that in a situation, an action’s principle that is usually in accordance with duty was performed completely on moral grounds and represented one’s duty. This is because it could be also looked at as an act of self-love that is falsely believed to be a noble act. There is no way to examine this for sure, but it does not make a difference because in the end the only thing that matters is the inner principle not the actions that actually take place. Furthermore, people want to believe that morality and the concepts of duty can be obtained solely from experience. For while majority of our actions are based off of duty, a closer look to our intentions and imaginations shows that we have a dear-self which comes forward and those actions rely on that. We genuinely wish for good and doubt at times what we see. Experience only adds or makes wiser and more acute our judgment, whether there is any good actually found. So it can be understood that even if there has never been actions that come from a pure place the only thing that actually matters is the reason, itself, that commands whether the actions ought to happen. Even for those who argue that experience is the core foundation would see that everything is still dependent on reason which will determine the will. 

 

          I gathered that Kant was trying to tell us that experience cannot be the foundation of morality because actions are not what would show the moral ground of duty. He goes on to explain that the moral ground of duty is not something you can see and therefore experiences based off of an action seen or unseen is something we as humans like to believe is the foundation of everything but is actually not. There is something deeper, which is the reason for the action that matters most. Reason is independent because it commands what ought to happen with no concern of the action.  

4:416-4:418

Kant describes within “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” the distinction between hypothetical imperatives, which exist in order to achieve some goal that is good, and categorical imperatives, which are good in themselves. He claims that one can assume happiness to be a shared aspiration among all rational beings, since they all have a natural and inherent need for it. The abilities and resources at a person’s disposal to acquire happiness are referred to as prudence, and Kant describes this as a hypothetical imperative, because it (prudence) is used to achieve something outside of itself (happiness).

Kant also claims that the ability to perform a task necessary to fulfill an imperative does not need to be thoroughly discussed, since the necessary actions are automatically associated with their achievements, and so they can be presupposed to occur if that achievement is fulfilled. He writes, “If I completely will the effect I also will the action required for it,” (4:417) since if a specific action is absolutely required to meet an end, that action alone cannot be separated from the idea of meeting that end.

However, there is a separation between the concepts of skill and prudence since the means of achieving happiness that would be directly associated with prudence are too indeterminate, ambiguous and diverse to be definitively indicated. Because happiness is vague and fleeting, and each person would require a great deal of different conditions to be met consistently in order to maintain it, and also because these conditions would be so strongly rooted in individual experience, no universal method of achieving happiness or skill required to do so could be specified.

Universal Moral Laws

In the second section of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant proposes the idea that we cannot create universal moral laws based on our own experiences. He even goes as far as stating that “no experience can give occasion to infer even just the possibility of such apodictic laws” (4:408). I object quite strongly to this argument. Due to the way we as human beings are wired, it is impossible for one to completely push aside prior experience when faced with making a decision. Even if we were to attempt to disregard any experiences we may have had, as well as the outcomes of those experiences, our actions would still be unconsciously biased because the past events and consequences of the events are biologically ingrained into our memories.  

Also, Kant frequently mentions the idea of “rational” human beings; but often when we think of rational people, we typically think of individuals who view all aspects of a situation and take into account the possible consequences of that action, prior to making any decision regarding their course of action. It would then appear illogical for a rational person, who according to Kant is able to determine categorical imperatives, to not reference any personal experience, cultural views, material interest, or analyze past actions, when determining what should be considered a moral principle.

Overall, the argument that when attempting to determine universal moral laws we cannot utilize our own personal experiences seems invalid. Not only is it nearly impossible to ignore what we have already learned from our experiences, it would also be quite illogical to not incorporate knowledge of consequences of certain actions into the formation of these moral laws. It is important that we understand the significance of actions in order to determine which actions would produce the most positive outcome and, as Mill would say, “maximize the good and minimize the bad”, to then determine which actions should be considered for universal moral principles. 

Kant Universal Law of Nature

Kant had previously described his categorical imperative in section one, that “I ought to never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” In section two, he splits up this ultimate rule into smaller ideas, the first one being the universal law of nature (4:421). Kant describes two ways in which a maxim can fail. The first is that the maxim as a universal law cannot contradict a universal law of nature because that would interfere with duty. An example of this would be someone who does not keep their promise to pay back a loan. If everyone accepted this way of thinking, promises would have no meaning and the system itself would fall apart. This violates Kant’s idea of a “perfect duty” because a perfect duty is a “negative” one. We discussed negative and positive duties in class, though not in those terms, when we compared actively doing something bad or passively failing to do something good.  Not paying back a loan would be criminal, bad, or a violation of perfect duty. The second way a maxim can fail is if it violates an imperfect duty, or fails to do “something rational agents necessarily will.” For example, one could not successfully declare a maxim of never helping someone in trouble, because most people would will to help the person and it violates an imperfect duty.

Weak Distinctions in a Moral Code

In Section II, Kant reaffirms his moral theory that one should “act according to the maxim that can make itself at the same time a universal law” (4: 437). While I generally agree with this point, I wonder how far Kant is willing to take it; on this matter, I do not think he has explained himself well enough.

For argument’s sake, let’s accept that it is morally good to give to those in need and that, if someone asks something of you, you should help that person. For instance, if you are at a train station and a stranger asks you for money to help pay the fare (and if you did not help, this person would have no other way to get home), you should do it. In this way, you would be expressing a pure will by helping another person without expectation of benefiting in the future. Additionally, you would be writing down “One should help another in need” in the universal law book. Kant agrees with this maxim, saying that if one believes one does not need to contribute anything if one does not want to, one “robs himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself” if he fell under similar circumstances (4:424). Thus, one ought to help others in need.

Now, let’s say you are walking on the streets of a city and, as you walk, you are approached by four beggars asking for money. If you are to follow Kant and your own maxim, you should help and give money to all four beggars and to every beggar thereafter who asks you for help. At no point could you say “I’ve given money to four beggars, so I don’t have to give to any other beggar today,” because then you would be making an exception for yourself, which you cannot do, according to Kant. Nor could you not give to any beggars, because then you would be breaking your own universal law that “One should help another in need.”

This poses two solutions in order to stay within the Kantian theory morality: Either obey your universal law and give to ever beggar who asks you for help, or redefine your universal law so that it is more specific and you can both follow it and give yourself a cut-off for almsgiving. However, neither of these seems to get to the nucleus of the problem. In the first case, by always giving to those who ask of you, you would essentially be making yourself into someone else’s “means,” which is not a good thing. Thus, there must be a sort of trade-off table between respecting another and respecting oneself; Kant’s moral theory does not address this. In the second case, we must ask ourselves how specific a moral law we can make. For instance, someone could say “One must not steal money from public fountains, unless the stolen sum is less than three pounds of coins”. Kant’s theory does not address specificity either. Thus, one could essentially create moral loopholes through which one can operate “morally.”

Imperatives

Throughout Kant’s “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” he acknowledges the idea that for something to be considered pure good will, the person must act on that rather than on the basis that the pure act will advantage them to some point. I am going to clarify some of the text present on page 4:415 about imperatives. Kant describes two types of imperatives in his work-hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives represent when a will is good, but is conditionally a means to something else. Categorical imperatives also represent when a will is good, but it is unconditional and pure. However, it is very difficult to truly distinguish something as a pure will without the knowledge that no other force is influencing the acts of someone. Kant describes the categorical imperatives as priori that require universal validity. Kant discusses hypothetical imperatives which can be divided into the two categories of problematically or apodictically.  The hypothetical imperatives go against Kant’s belief of what good will is because the acts are only done in a means of achieving a certain purpose.  However, hypothetical imperatives are more complicated when dealing with the goal of happiness because it is unknown what will bring about that goal. Neither hypothetical imperatives nor categorical imperatives can be easily defined due to many underlying indistinguishable factors.  

blog post 5

Kant says that actions should not be considered truly moral if they are not done purely out of duty.  If the person doing said action, feels any joy, then it is not moral.  I am afraid that this argument would suggest that nothing is truly moral then.  I can't think of any examples of an action done solely out of a sense of duty.  There is always some ulterior motive, no matter how small it may be.  Doing good things makes people feel good, and I don't believe that makes it any less of a moral thing.  Also, if someone is volunteering or doing good and they enjoy it, they will probably do a much better job than if they were simply doing it out of a sense of duty.  I don't think there is a good enough argument presented to suggest that there is no morality without a pure sense of duty.  In fact I would find it hard pressed to make an argument that says that a pure sense of duty even exists.

4:407

          The second section: Transition from moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals of Kant mainly discusses how it’s impossible to find behavior solely based on duty alone, and basically discusses how pure motives are. The passage that introduces this ideology starts in the very beginning.  I will be further analyzing the second paragraph of the second section, which is 4:407. The paragraph starts out by saying that it is difficult to determine whether an action purely was done on moral grounds and only on one’s duty. Sometimes situations arise that nothing, besides the moral ground of duty, could be more influential enough to do such an extraordinary action that required a lot of sacrifice that the person had to go through.  People automatically think that the behavior is done for their own personal gain or some other motive, but you can’t jump to that conclusion only based on the significance of the action and how much sacrifice it takes. On the other hand, we can’t just assume the action was done on a moral motive either. Basically, we can never 100% know the motives of an action because sometimes the person doesn't even know themselves. Even if we do the best examination and scrutiny of a situation, theirs is no way of telling what the true incentives are. The moral worth is not defined by the actions that we see, but it is determined by the interior values someone has. Unfortunately, this is something that we can’t see from the exterior.

Blog post #5

Post to the blog by Wednesday night at 11:00 PM concerning Kant's Groundwork, Section II (and the first couple pages of Section III) (that's German pages 4:406–4:448). Write on one of the three following options: (a) defend an argument in the reading; (b) object to an argument in the reading; or (c) clarify an argument or passage in the reading.

What's Good

Mental State theory says that good just depends on how you feel, so murderers and rapists are good so long as they’re happy. I’m not biting that bullet.

Narrative Flow theory is very interesting but comes to the same problem as Equality theory— what’s a good narrative flow? Who decides? If I have an experience machine and my wish is to get on an experience machine while on the experience machine ad infinitum to achieve an Inception-esque timeline where I live every life imaginable, but my loved ones still miss me and hate me, then did I have Good narrative flow? What’s Good?

            Equality theory states we should bring everyone to equal grounds. I’ve got a few problems with this one: first the only way we’re all equal is if we’re all dead, next there are people who like when everyone’s the same and others (me) who don’t (where’s the fun in being a computer?) and last where’s the good?  What the hell does equality mean? This theory doesn’t really seem to define good it just says we should be equal, so unless this theory stands on a different theory of intrinsic good what’s wrong with me saying we should all be dead? So let’s say that happiness is what’s Good (Mill all the way) but only in as much as everyone is equally happy. That’s nice, but some people are happy about other people’s pain. In fact pain is inevitable in this life so this theories perfect world would be made entirely of laugh-happy socio-paths. Finally for anyone who really believes in equality, I see revolutionaries or hypocrisy.

            Well-being theories just fall short for me. What’s well-being? It can’t be what’s good since that’s a circular argument. Well there are a lot of things we can say go into well-being like being healthy, educated and happy. I think the premise we’re all moving towards is that we’re good. We need something more to retain the good that’s talking right now so we need to stay healthy, happy and informed. How do we know though? I’m going to go the other way. We’re not good— or at least we’re not sure. That’s why we have to try so hard figuring out why one theory of good is better than another. And for that matter what good is. This is the moral relativism I’m attracted to. Every moral insight is worth looking at. Everyone who’s ever put oneself or another thing in the category of good is simply trying to balance their experience up until now. And we may be getting closer but we don’t know what Good is as long as we’re asking the question. The way I see it the only way we can be sure we know what’s good is if we know questions are good.

More light illuminates ambiguity.

Justice

I believe that there should be another category or theory of intrinsic value and goodness. The proposed theories all have a lot of power, but when combined they can mean a lot more. A simple concept that I think captures all of these theories is justice. Justice has intrinsic value because it provides a mix of the goodness theories that have been laid out. In simple terms it can be defined as giving everything it’s due right.

In terms of ecosystems and well-being (two things which are thought to have intrinsic value), you have to give due right to both. Our well-being is important and “good” and so is the ecosystem that we are surrounded by. In order to give due rights to both, we  cannot havoc the ecosystem without any cause. We also cannot let our desires take over an intrinsic good that exists, but rather we can use it in a way that increases our well-being without doing much harm. In the case of animals which are part of ecosystems, I think it would be wrong to say that we cannot kill any animal for our own well-being. Also, it would be wrong to say that animals don’t have any right over us which we should abide by. The best way to give due rights to both, our well-being and animals, would be to slaughter animals in a way that does not afflict them with much pain. As humans who have a higher understanding, we acknowledge that animals can feel pain and should use that knowledge to kill them in way that minimizes pain when needed for our own well-being.

We also have to be just with ourselves and our bodies. Our mental state of well-being cannot simply be the definition of good if we violate rights that we have to our own bodies. This means that we should not do things that could cause us harm to a different part of ourselves, our body.

Justice is something that also prevails when dealing with equality. When talking about justice and equality when someone is being treated equally with everything they are not necessarily being dealt with in a just way. A hypothetical situation can be created if there is a fence in which 3 people need to look over it to watch a sporting event. The three people would something to stand on in order to see. It would be considered equality if every one of them was given the same thing. However, a shorter person may still be too short to look over the fence. In that sense justice would be the ultimate good that would allow all of them to look over the fence. If the shorter person was given something taller to stand on justice would prevail. This means that the greater good was done by being just.¹

¹http://kathyescobar.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/equality-vs-justice.jpg

Outlier

In my opinion, I think equality is definitely the most defensible intrinsic good. In the example in class, we were asked to choose between a world (A) where one person's well-being stood out while the others remained low, and a world (B) where everyone was equal.

When the numbers started to decrease, it seemed like the second world was at some kind of disadvantage. I however, disagree. The way I see it is that the second world maintained its well-being very uniformly. While the well-being units decreased, everyone still had the highest amount. Therefore, there was really no disadvantage since no one would know of what was missing since everyone had the same thing. World A on the other hand, has a larger impact when the numbers shift around. The disadvantages are a lot clearer, because of the presence of the outlier. No matter how low the units get for World B, I feel like it can be normally distributed somehow the same way exams are curved. An A paper in one semester of a class might have been a B paper in another. I feel like with the presence of one person standing by so much, to the point that it is an outlier, it should not be included in the data set for calculating the total units of well-being.

Having said that, I do not think that there can be perfectly equal amounts of well-being, so I believe that have numbers closest to the average should be counted as equal.

The Experience Machine

If pleasure is the only intrinsic good, then we should do whatever we can to maximize it for the most amount of time. If such a machine existed where we could simulate a maximally pleasing life and the user didn’t know he or she was using it, the fullest life would only be realized through this machine. Controversy exists in the removal of any trueness or meaning to the exterior world around the user with the exception of first-person experience. The people I would interact with in the machine do not have actual “people” or “minds” behind them. They are merely projections from complex software being imaged directly into my consciousness.  The hedonist would probably say there is nothing wrong with the machine. Ignorance is bliss and what you don’t know won’t hurt you. However, the existence of controversy in the first place says something about what actually has intrinsic value.  I do not question the intrinsic value of pleasure, but what of the intrinsic value of meaning and truth? Having an experience machine removes any meaning to the actions we do besides that of getting pleasure; even if the user is unaware of being in such a machine. If someone truly wants to help those in need, the experience machine can easily replicate them having such a life. Though, their actions mean nothing in terms of actually helping the needy. If one were to discover he or she was in the machine (at least for helping the poor), would they not want to get out? They may get pleasure in their ignorance, but their desire is for something beyond personal feeling. Thus, if pleasure is the only intrinsic good, what we sometimes desire does not line up with getting pleasure as the end all. 

The Best of the Six Theories

This question is difficult to answer.  Few people would determine that one of the six theories is sufficient to defend.  Instead, they are all of a great deal of importance.  Although this is the case, some theories are more defensible than others.  The last two theories about beauty and ecosystems, although important, are not central to the intrinsic good in our world.  In my opinion, accepting one theory would be an oversimplification.  I believe the order in which we discussed them is more or less the order I would rank them in terms of importance.

In my opinion, wellbeing is the most central and important of Mill’s arguments, serving as an umbrella argument.  Arguments 2-6, serve somewhat as sub-points, playing off of wellbeing as either something that adds to wellbeing (like beauty) or that adds specificity to the distribution of wellbeing.  Since that is the case, I am inclined to most support the first argument.  If one must distinguish the most important factor that contributes to Mill’s argument about good, it would be wellbeing.  To Mill, wellbeing is of primary importance, and that in order to maximize the good, and minimize the bad, one must focus on the wellbeing of others.  We saw an example of this in the Singer reading about donating money to refugees in Bengal.  Improving people’s overall wellbeing is definitely important to improving intrinsic good on a large scale.  Theories 2-4 are important in narrowing down the importance of how that wellbeing is distributed and 5-6 establish that there are other things that are intrinsically good and can improve wellbeing. 

I do not completely buy into the mental state theory.  I think there is more to good and wellbeing than an internalist experience.  I do believe that the wellbeing argument can be held up by some kind of compromise between the desire-satisfaction theory, and the objective list theory.  I find the six points oversimplifying what is intrinsically good and how to act in ways that maximize the good when considered alone.  I think they are best defended when thought of in the context of each other.  Another example of this is arguments 2-3, which are equality, and desert.

I believe that equality and desert deserve special attention in determining the context for well-being.  Our conversation about equality and desert captured my attention because I noticed many people in the class disagreed about the importance of desert factoring into equality.  We touched on this topic briefly in class, and I wanted to expand upon that idea.  I cannot accept the concept that desert is formulaic, and all humans, regardless of their behavior, deserve equal amounts of good.  In my opinion, that argument contradicts the concept of equality.  I can understand that if everyone acted the same way, each person would deserve the same level of wellbeing.

I am very much in favor of some of Mill’s points about what has intrinsic value, but I believe they must not be considered separately from each other.  I am a strong believer that consequences matter, but I think that maximizing the good and minimizing the bad requires a conversation between these separate arguments about what has intrinsic value.