The Intrinsic Moral Compass

In the argument against moral relativity, the author of “Ethics and Religion: Moral Relativity” contends that a person who does not accept the existence of an objective moral truth would therefore believe that there is “no objective, culturally independent standard by which to judge the moral code of a culture” (15). Having no picture of what is objectively right or wrong, this person then “cannot criticize another culture’s practices” or even one’s own culture (16). It seems that the argument the author is making is that, because there is no concrete moral truth, each culture’s moral code is “right” in its own sense and none can say it is wrong because there is no true sense of wrongness. This argument seems to be sound; however, it relies that such a person would not believe that at least some acts are undoubtedly immoral. This is very unlikely.

Humans cannot create an idea that we have not either experienced or felt; we are limited by what exists. It is impossible for rightness and wrongness to only be an imagined concept, because there is nothing so similar to it from which we could draw. Thus, although one may not believe in an objective moral truth, one would still recognize the idea of rightness and wrongness, because if one did not, the question of morality would not exist. Since humans possess this idea, it is implied that they have an intrinsic moral compass. Because of the moral compass, certain actions would be considered to be naturally good or naturally evil, however broad the idea. For instance, one might not be able to discern whether giving money to the poor or sending your mother on a vacation is the better moral choice, but one would discern that each would be morally better than spending the money on buying a flashy car. Thus, a person would be able to criticize the moral code of a culture, because he or she would be appealing to his or her intrinsic moral compass.