Marginal Utility

            Although I agree with Singer and the moderate version of his argument, I do not agree when Singer suggests that those in affluent countries ought to reduce their quality of life to close to that of a Bengal refugee.

            When Singer suggests this, it seems to me that he does so because he believes that one of the bad things that we must prevent is inequality itself.  He does not actually say that inequality is the bad thing, but he seems to imply that a dollar is worth more to a person with less money than to a person with more, so only by distributing dollars equally would we reach a point where moving a dollar from one person to another does more harm than good, i.e. the point of marginal utility or the point at which donating would cause “as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift”.

            I agree that donating should be done to a point of marginal utility.  However, I would disagree that this point of marginal utility is reached only once one has reduced their wealth to equal that of a Bengal refugee or until everyone is nearly equal.

            First, quality of life is not directly tied to wealth.  I may look to celebrities who are wealthier than I am and I may wish I had a party yacht at times, but I do not consider my life to be “worse” than theirs simply because of our difference in wealth.  Similarly, it seems likely that there are people who view those in my economic class in the same way.  Therefore, it seems possible that two people can be fairly far apart in terms of pure dollars while having similar levels of life satisfaction.  Of course, this does not mean that Bengal refugees or others in similar situations view basic medical necessities the same way I view a party yacht.  I am simply trying to point out that it is probably better to view quality of life using a threshold (perhaps one involving medical necessities, housing, nutritious food, etc.) than to view it as purely a question of inequality of wealth.  Beyond this threshold, it may be nice to continue giving money, but it does not seem to me to fall under the realm of moral duty.

            Second, there is also a cost to significantly reducing one’s standard of wealth and life.  To use an extreme example of the cost of losing, a person who becomes paralyzed probably suffers more than a person who was born paralyzed.  Similarly, there is also probably a point at which donating an extremely large amount and equalizing one’s standard of living to another person’s may have a cost that outweighs the benefit.  This is not to say that a small reduction in quality of life does not fall within the realm of duty, simply that Singer’s reduction in standard of living seems severe.

            Considering these points, it seems to me that my current donations of 10% of my (admittedly tiny) income is fair to expect of me because if everyone in affluent countries did the same, we could raise everyone’s standard of living and quality of life to an acceptable threshold.  However, a donation that would force me to reduce myself to a state of near poverty seems to go beyond a point of marginal utility and does not seem to me to be a moral requirement.