Moral relativism and absolute tolerance

The authors of the piece don't seem too keen on the idea of moral relativism. They only attack this claim in one form: cultural morals vary and occasionally oppose one another, therefore all morality is subjective. It is a very particular formulation of the argument that they pick apart, and while I wouldn't quite characterize the argument they examine as a strawman, they fail to address the fundamental claim that there are no objective morals.

The authors address a number of sub-arguments posited by a theoretical "skeptic" all having in common that they derive from the existence of a diversity of perspectives the conclusion that all these perspectives are equally valid. The authors oppose this view with a number of arguments; the first of which states that just because there are a diversity of moral codes, that does not exclude the possibility of universal principles that appear in most or all of these codes. I don't really have a problem with this argument, but it only advances the possibility of morally objective principles, not their certainty. The existence of shared values does not serve to weaken the position of moral relativism. It is compatible with either view.

They go on to make several arguments about how this particular permutation of the argument for moral relativism is flawed. I agree with pretty much all these arguments. I guess what I'm really objecting to here is the posturing of these arguments against a very specific argument for ethical relativism. At one point, the authors make the argument that under moral relativism, people acting according to the moral codes of their cultures are immune to criticism. Which is nonsense. The claim that the only appropriate response under moral relativism to the practice of clitorectomy is tolerance is particularly infuriating. The belief in a lack of objective truths does not mean a lack of subjective ones. I feel moral outrage at the thought of such senseless suffering. I imagine quite a lot of people do. Does the fact that the majority of people recognize something as wrong make it objectively wrong? I would say not. But there is certainly room for a good deal of criticism. The conflation of moral relativism with a sort of reckless, "anything goes" brand of tolerance and then attacking that brand of tolerance does not disprove moral relativism, nor does it further the existence of objective moral truths.

The authors attack a very specific formulation of moral relativism and then declare moral relativism itself a failure in the closing paragraphs of the section. I feel that many of their arguments are valid, but they are aimed at a specific formulation of moral relativism based on cultural relativism, and do not sufficiently attack moral relativism to deem it a failure.