Wednesday, September 24, 2014

Weak Distinctions in a Moral Code

In Section II, Kant reaffirms his moral theory that one should “act according to the maxim that can make itself at the same time a universal law” (4: 437). While I generally agree with this point, I wonder how far Kant is willing to take it; on this matter, I do not think he has explained himself well enough.

For argument’s sake, let’s accept that it is morally good to give to those in need and that, if someone asks something of you, you should help that person. For instance, if you are at a train station and a stranger asks you for money to help pay the fare (and if you did not help, this person would have no other way to get home), you should do it. In this way, you would be expressing a pure will by helping another person without expectation of benefiting in the future. Additionally, you would be writing down “One should help another in need” in the universal law book. Kant agrees with this maxim, saying that if one believes one does not need to contribute anything if one does not want to, one “robs himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself” if he fell under similar circumstances (4:424). Thus, one ought to help others in need.

Now, let’s say you are walking on the streets of a city and, as you walk, you are approached by four beggars asking for money. If you are to follow Kant and your own maxim, you should help and give money to all four beggars and to every beggar thereafter who asks you for help. At no point could you say “I’ve given money to four beggars, so I don’t have to give to any other beggar today,” because then you would be making an exception for yourself, which you cannot do, according to Kant. Nor could you not give to any beggars, because then you would be breaking your own universal law that “One should help another in need.”

This poses two solutions in order to stay within the Kantian theory morality: Either obey your universal law and give to ever beggar who asks you for help, or redefine your universal law so that it is more specific and you can both follow it and give yourself a cut-off for almsgiving. However, neither of these seems to get to the nucleus of the problem. In the first case, by always giving to those who ask of you, you would essentially be making yourself into someone else’s “means,” which is not a good thing. Thus, there must be a sort of trade-off table between respecting another and respecting oneself; Kant’s moral theory does not address this. In the second case, we must ask ourselves how specific a moral law we can make. For instance, someone could say “One must not steal money from public fountains, unless the stolen sum is less than three pounds of coins”. Kant’s theory does not address specificity either. Thus, one could essentially create moral loopholes through which one can operate “morally.”

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