Kant's Abstract Ideas About Morality

Kant is transparent in conveying to his readers that his concern is with “moral worth” and acting from “pure duty” (4:406).  I am interested in intent, and find that good intentions often result in positive action, but Kant does not take into account well enough the idea of misguided action carried out by a good will.  Kant is very adamant about determining a good will, but leaves a very abstract interpretation of what ways we can carry out our good will.

Kant establishes that there is a difference between the hypothetical and the categorical by noting that the former imperative assumes action is good when there is actual purpose, whereas the latter is reason driven action, or “action is represented as good in itself”  (4:414-15).  I find it idealistic and frustrating to assume that action backed by pure will is all that is important.  The consequence and result of an action matters a great deal.  Though some do not have the means to providing change, it is impractical to assume that change will come simply by willing it to happen.  

Kant tries to distinguish that knowing what causes happiness requires experience and argue that morality cannot be determined in the same way (4:418).  Instead, he says morality is categorical and unconditional (4:419), and moral duty should be treated as “practical unconditional necessity of action” (4:425). Though it would be positive to be able to follow a moral code that does not change, I think that realistically, our sense of morality is highly empirical.  I find myself on a regular basis revising my moral code, and my behavior in ordinance with that moral code.  I learn about the world and the ways people act and respond to what is happening, and my beliefs change.  I do not find beliefs and morality synonymous, but I do find myself zeroing in on a sharper sense of where my moral standards lie.  Experience is a crucial part of that understanding, and the abstract nature of Kant’s argument, and his refusal to acknowledge that experience influences how we react to uphold our moral standards is confusing.

I reacted negatively when Kant admitted that his concern was more with intent, and less with results, “what ought to happen, even if it never does” (4:427).  He dips his toes in the idea that happiness is important to people, and how we create a compromise between our good will and selfishness, but comes to the conclusion that “we do not need to investigate the grounds of why something pleases or displeases” (4:427).  I was again frustrated with the idea that Kant is so abstract that he heavily ignores consequences.  After reading Mill, I find this not only difficult to follow and to apply to all situations.  I also find it less defensible than Mill’s appeal to consequence.  We often act based on consequence, which is hard to expect people to change.