Famine, Affluence, and Morality

At first glance, Singer’s main argument in Famine, Affluence, and Morality seems to be a sound one. The premises of his central argument are hard to disagree with; especially the preliminary assumption that he bases his entire argument off of. This presumption or what most people would call an undeniable truth is that, “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” [230].  From there, Singer asserts that if it is within one’s financial means and ability to prevent the suffering of another (from the bad things listed above) then, one morally “ought” to do so. His argument follows the typical transitive property logic. The logic is simple and the reasoning makes sense. However, I think that his argument is only sound when it is applied to a specific cause (i.e. the suffering in East Bengal) because one cannot donate to every single cause in the world. I think the logic behind Singer’s “global village” concept and “drowning child” scenario is flawed [232].  Singer says that people are “more likely” to assist those who are geographically closer to themselves; thereby, neglecting those who are further away and in need [232].  This may be an accurate assumption; however, it neglects to take into account the positive impacts that the relationship between proximity and aid can have on human suffering. Furthermore this “likelihood” logic for aid can be used to construct an argument against him. Someone could make the “charity starts at the home” argument by arguing that suffering people in other countries also have neighbors that are “more likely” to help them. Thus, if everyone helps those in need closest to them, then the urgency and degree of need for foreign aid should decrease.  If one does not discriminate geographically, then how should one go about choosing the sufferings in which they will help to prevent? Singer’s argument fails to answer this important question.