Blog 1

In his article Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer makes compelling arguments about what is just of an individual, stating that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 231). This principle suggests that if one is financially able to give aid to someone else in need, then it is only right to do so. Singer then goes on and specifies that as a society, the decent thing to do would be to continuously donate until marginal unity is reached. If everyone reaches marginal unity then those who need aid now will soon find themselves existing in under “normal” circumstances.

I cannot help but to question the theoretical end of his idea of morality, and believe that since its not addressed, it creates possible objections to his principles. Singer uses the example of saving a drowning boy as the obvious right choice, without question. The little boy may be drowning, however he also might be a murderer and saving his life would cost lives later on. Saving him would be the accepted act; however is it still considered moral if consequential actions are morally wrong? Relating it back to aid, say a poor family in Bangladesh only needs $5.00 to break out of poverty. Soon they receive $10.00 in donations, putting them above marginal unity. Singer would suggest that the family should then in turn take the residual $5.00 and donate it to someone more impoverished than them, however if they do not then they are acting immorally with the money someone donated. Does this then make the donation immoral? I believe if Singer just addresses the hypothetical “end” of an act of morality, his argument would stand sounder.