Satisfied Desires

I think the most defensible formulation of Utilitarianism is that which defines "satisfied desires" as an intrinsic good. I reject the paternalistic objectivity of  the objective list theory because it seems impossible to create one list of things that lead to an objectively moral life for anyone in any situation. The task seems impossible. The positive mental state theory seemed convincing to me at first, but the businessman and simulation examples made me realize that this theory is ONLY concerned with mental states, and so someone who was deceived or deceived themselves into a state of happiness but actually led a life I would consider pretty awful would still be considered to be living a good life under this theory. That doesn't make the theory objectively untenable, but it sure convinced me. I think that morality begins where thought does, so the theories that rely on intrinsic goods outside human observation don't convince me. I think the satisfied desires theory of utilitarianism accounts for a variety of human circumstances, so it seems broad enough to account for everyone. It is grounded in reality (externalist) rather than being grounded in experience (internalist). I prefer the externalist to the internalist formulation because I think the way you interact with other people and the impact you make on their lives is an important part of ethics. The mere appearance of interaction won't do in comparison to actually making a meaningful impact on the world and, more importantly, the people around you. One notable objection to the satisfied desires theory is that it could lead to an evaluation that someone can have their desires satisfied without knowing it. How can it be a good measure of wellbeing if the person itself isn't aware of their desire being satisfied? This objection doesn't bother me overmuch as I believe the fact of the matter to be more important than one's perception of the matter. As for the goods other than wellbeing, I value equality up to the point where it impedes total wellbeing by 50%. I'll take narrative over nonnarrative if there's a choice, but I won't compromise either equality or total wellbeing for the sake of narrative.

Balance of Pleasure

Through the discussions held in class as well as the assigned readings from Mill’s Utilitarianism, I have been brought to the conclusion that the theory of well-being is the most defensible. Within well-being, the most defensible theory would be that of the mental state view, which states that pleasure is the basis for true happiness. Considering the fact that Mill believes “right” actions are ones that maximize the good and minimize the bad, it seems ridiculous to argue that increasing one’s own pleasure would be going against Mill’s belief, especially due to the circumstance that pleasure is often viewed as a good thing.

As humans, it would appear that when placed in a situation where a decision must be made, we would choose the option that would increase pleasure because pleasure makes us feel good, thus increasing the good in our lives. Mill mentions the argument that if we are only to act upon things based off pleasure, we would be swinish and at the same level as animals; however, he implies that it is necessary to consider that there are levels of pleasure and that not all pleasurable things are “swinish”. Due to these varying levels of pleasure, one is able to still act with intentions of pleasure as a goal, yet not be overloaded with pleasure, which would then cause them to be considered animalistic. For example, if an individual is to eat one or two cookies, something they find to be pleasurable, that individual is not being piggish; but, if that same individual were to eat fifty cookies, it would seem there would be a pleasure overload, and only then would that person be considered swinish.

With the argument that pleasure has somewhat of a spectrum and is not just extremes, the rationality of this theory is supported. Personally, I believe balance in life is an important concept to grasp. Too much or too little of something would seem to be unhealthy and increasing the bad in life; that is why it is important to balance the pleasure in life just as you would balance other aspects, even something as simple as food as I mentioned in the cookie example. Due to the spectrum of pleasure, it is very possible to increase pleasure, thus increasing good, without going overboard and becoming swinish, as long as balance is kept.

Equality of All

          Equality is the most defensible theory of goodness and intrinsic value because it plays a role in the other theories that connects them together. Equality acts like an overarching theme that strengthens each theory:  well-being, desert, narrative flow, beauty, and ecosystems.

         Equality of well-being could be understood as equally distributing an amount of well-being amongst everyone and allowing them the capacity to heighten their individual well-being depending on there choices. This was seen in class with the two different charts of 10 people. One chart showed each of the 10 people with an equal distributed amount of well-being. The other chart showed 9 of those 10 people with an equal amount of well-being and then 1 person with an amount that is higher than that of the 9 other people. Even though the second chart had a higher amount of total well-being in comparison to the first chart, the first chart distributed the well-being that they had equally.  As a result the first chart can be viewed as a better/good group thus making equality an intrinsic value in connection to the theory of well-being.  

       Equality of desert would work similarly in that it would be understood as everyone equally deserving of happiness. For an example, if you have a nun and a prisoner. Both deserve an equal amount of happiness and according to equality of well-being, both would be given an equal amount of well-being.  One might argue and say that the nun is in a better environment to obtain happiness because she worked to deserve it. I would reply that the nun made decisions that put her in a more comfortable position to obtain her amount of happiness under circumstances convenient for her, but that does not mean the prisoner cannot obtain the same amount of happiness as the nun while in prison.

       Equality in narrative flow would be understood as the value of having an equally steady distribution of happiness throughout one’s lifespan. For instance, the linear graph example from class was of an individual having a steady increase of happiness starting from birth and ending at death.  If that person had to choose between living life with the increase and living life with a steady decrease of happiness starting at birth and ending at death, that person might choose the increase. On the other hand if there were another choice on the table one with a steady line across of happiness at a certain level, one would be more attracted too that because of the element of equality throughout. Someone could argue about there being moments when people are happier than other happy moments, and I would explain that this theory would take that into account as I said earlier raising happiness would still be an option depending on the decisions made. Overall this example shows the theory that there is intrinsic value in equality of narrative flow.

          Beauty and ecosystems are the two theories that I find most flawed, but could still hold true under my theory of connectedness through equality. Equality of beauty would be understood as there being an equal sharing of beauty to all things. An example of this might be that a palm tree to some may not be found beautiful but to others it could be of great beauty and adds to their overall happiness in life. Now one may argue that there are just some things that are downright hideous. To that I would challenge them to find those things and do a survey asking about its aesthetic value and if 99.9% of the population confirmed this, I would then be slightly convinced. Ecosystems are similar in that the equality of ecosystems would be understood as everything in nature being equally connected. This just means that there is an intrinsic value in seeing living and non-living things working together, and along with that revelation would be the fact that they have to all be equally connected in order to interact efficiently. If one part of the system failed to connect with another the whole system would falter.

          In all I believe that equality is the most defensible theory of goodness and intrinsic value because it plays a role in the other theories that connects them together which include: well-being, desert, narrative flow, beauty, and ecosystems.

Goodness behind Well-Being

Throughout Mill's Utilitarianism he focuses on what will make our lives intrinsically good and moral. I feel that Mill's most defensible theory would be the one that says "good" is concerned with our well-being. Under the well-being theory we have 3 sub-theories that include Mental State Theory, which concerns pleasure, Desire Satisfaction Theory and the Objective List Theory. I find this Well-being theory the most pleasing and defensible for the reason that it has these underlying  sub-theories. I am going to look at each sub-theory and talk about its characteristics and why I believe it is a good theory.

The first theory I will  look at is the Mental State View which considers pleasure to be the backbone of intrinsic good. We looked at an objection in class that said this view would justify even the most outlandish or "piggish" pleasures to be intrinsically good. I would have to argue back and say so what? If that is what makes the person the most happy, then why not? For them it is good; this view is not objective. If living a selfish life is what someone finds pleasure in then fine, I am not saying  it is morally good but in another sense it is good for them. In class we used the Experience Machine as another objection to this view, and I agreed that I would not want to get into this machine since it would not fulfill my pleasure of helping people if I actually became an occupational therapist versus the perfect life I would lead in the machine without actually helping anyone. But once again, it is subjective. I find it empty to live a life like that since it is not what I find pleasurable, but maybe there is some person out there where their only dream to skate through life and this would fit into their pleasure!

The next view we looked at was the Desired Satisfaction View which talks about how intrinsic good comes from out desires coming true. The objection says that this would once again allow any desires to be fulfilled and count as good. However, I must push on the rejoinder that says that as long as the desire is rational, not harming anyone and makes the person in questions life better, then why not? As long as the person is fully informed on what their desire entails and is not infringing on someone else's desire it should be intrinsically good.

The last view is the Objective List  View which I find to be appealing in a strange way. We are given a list of things that if they are fulfilled should make our lives intrinsically better. This list includes but is not limited to Pleasure, satisfied desires, freedom, knowledge, achievement, beauty relationships, etc. If looking at this list in an even more objective way one would say those are very broad categories. However, while it  has these categories one could try and achieve certain things within them; what one person wants from life will never be what another person does. So while trying to achieve this objective list, they could be striving for different things still. An extreme-ish example I am going to try and use is for the relationships category. What is person A wants a life filled with beautiful, strong relationships and person B wants nothing like that, they instead life solitude and maybe one or two friends. They have different expectations for these categories and can still make them subjective while keeping the lists categories. So while it is intrinsically good to have reach relationship goals the goals may vary from person to person.

Well-being/Pleasure, Subjectivity, and Our Experience

I believe well-being/pleasure is the most defensible intrinsic Good, though I believe there must be room for subjective beliefs to affect how we experience this pleasure. The Experience Machine and Deceived Businessman examples represent very important objections that show the limits of well-being on its own. I want to show that well-being is the most important intrinsic good, but it is merely the bottom line or "basic needs met" version of intrinsic goods. It is worth noting that I believe our collective agreement to enter in society and the rules and restrictions have a role in my addendum that subjectivity must be considered as society has changed our experience of pleasure, but for the sake of brevity I will not expand on this idea any further.

I agree to an extent with Hale's post on this blog about the importance of the phaneron to every human. Our experience of this world comes down to our experiences of pain and pleasure. At the very simplest level, we are just sentient brain mush in control of a body that can move around. At the very least, we should be able to enjoy our experiences in our surrounding. It is impossible for us to get some sort of objective experience of this world; indeed, it even seems impossible for us to imagine what such an experience would look or feel like. If there is no other way to experience our environment, it seems that the pleasure-pain spectrum is the only real and consistent way to get to the Good of existence. (I mean consistent in that we can always expect to feel some form of pleasure or pain through every experience we have.)

While it seems good enough for well-being, there is something that the Experience Machine shows us that points to pleasure not being the only thing worth desiring. The rejoinder that "ignorance is bliss" is not a good enough response to the Experience Machine for me. I agree that the person in the Experience Machine lives a more pleasurable life, and that life is good, but at least some of us place importance on the genuineness of our experiences (especially if we have the choice). The problem for those like me with the "ignorance is bliss" rejoinder is that even if we do not know that we are experiencing a disingenuous pleasure, that does not change the fact that we are. In other words, the genuineness of our experience of pleasure is important enough that the Experience Machine does not create a life that is as personally Good as the genuine experience of life is. While this may seem at odds with the previous paragraph, let me make clear that it is not. The Experience Machine still creates a life full of Goodness, regardless of one's subjective belief in the importance of genuine experience. The Experience Machine creates a life that meets the basic needs of living a Good life, and having this basic need met is completely good enough for some people. However, other people's subjective belief create an existence where genuine experience (or as genuine an experience as we can get) of our experiences can override the importance of maximizing pleasure.

Utilitarianism and Merit

I believe the best defensible version of utilitarianism is one that includes a well defined merit system (desert). In addition to the principle that we are morally obligated to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, I believe that this should preferentially go to those who deserve it. How good we are at upholding the first principle would then in turn determine how much preference we deserve in the second. The preference would take the form of a heavier weight being given towards the pleasure and pain of those who deserve it more. For example, suppose a humanitarian worker and murderer were under similar suffering, under this type of utilitarianism, we would favor the humanitarian worker because they deserve it more. However, this weight would be relative to the magnitude of the pleasure or suffering being measured, and simply gives it an added weight, not immediate priority. So again if a humanitarian worker had a slight migraine and thief had his arm severed the chopped off arm still would include more suffering. If the wrongdoer were a murderer however, they would deserve less (relative to the pain they caused) and there perhaps the migraine would be worth more. However this is an individual basis and ideally we would be helping the humanitarians with greater suffering than lesser pains.

One may argue that this system is not equal, as it assigns an arbitrary added weight to someone's suffering simply because they are perceived as good. First, the strength of this weight can be adjusted based on major opinion and need not be static. Also, I would argue that it is equal because it makes no sense to let the Mother Teresas of the world suffer while a Nazi SS officer does not. Of course, we could consider the situation where both are happy, and as an after thought, let the Nazi SS officer be placed in prison so he cannot cause more harm. This world is certainly ideal, but it gives no incentive for people to continue to maximize pleasure or minimize pain. In fact, the only punishment for hurting others seems to be being sent to jail, and in this ideal world, would not affect our well-being because we would still be happy. Following a merit system would ensure that a greater variety of people then become Mother Teresas, because they would be guaranteed more pleasure (happiness).

Someone might then ask, would not this simply create a system where people "suck up" to the system to get what they want? This is true, many people doing good deeds would simply do them for selfish reasons, rather than because they actually want to help others. However, would the truth value of this statement actually matter? Regardless of their intentions, more good is being done in the world, in turn increasing global happiness and lowering suffering. And if others then join the bandwagon to receive the benefits, this would simply create a snowball effect of people doing good deeds. The intention behind each action is meaningless, because it has no effect on the outcome, which is increased happiness.

The reason I find the merit system the most defensible version of utilitarianism is because I believe it avoids the awkward moments where we are forced to defend situations where doing good may seem bad. Consider the situation where someone considered useless to society, perhaps a homeless person, is a perfect organ donor match for multiple people. Normally under utilitarianism we would be forced to say that since we would be saving multiple people for the sacrifice of one (useless) person this would be the "good" thing to do. However a merit system would prevent this from happening because short of committing murder, the homeless person would not deserve being used for organs. On the opposite scale, we could consider a situation where the ones receiving the organs would be Mother Teresas, and there we would seemingly be forced to give them the organs. However as stated above the added weight of the pleasure and pain can be changed, so we could change it so that the homeless man (who did nothing wrong) would also receive a weight because we could consider him a blank slate. This would also help out others who have done nothing wrong but are not Mother Teresas (such as infants or invalids) from some injustice they do not deserve.

well-being and equality

            Well-being and equality seem to be the most important intrinsic values of good. Well-being is the very core part of the intrinsic value. However, well-being itself is not enough for goodness; equality is also necessary. Some might say that the theory of desertion is also necessary, given the example in the class of Hitlers followers and Mother Teresa. In that case, the theory of desertion is important for goodness however this is not always the case. In the case of President Bush and President Obama, the theory of desertion would have different meaning for people with different ideas. Therefore it can be very subjective and thought of as an instrumental value instead of intrinsic value. The theory of equality is more universal because without equality, a person has a more difficult time being good. This is because it is in a human’s nature to live in a society and have relations with others. Without equality and well-being people will feel guilty because others are not as well off as them. An example of this is when you know that there are people suffering; it makes you feel remorseful. I think that it this part human nature, which enables us to care about others. When people volunteer at places where there are people in need of help, many say that the happy reactions that come from the people they help have an uplifting effect on them.  Sharing ones well-being leads to equality, which then increases the overall well-being. Therefore, equality and well-being are very important intrinsic values.

Equality

The most defensible good is Equality.  Everyone should be considered equal.  No one is more important than anyone else.  If everyone was equal in well-being there would be much more good than bad.  No one would have to fight in order to achieve equality.  There would probably be no more war because everyone would have the same amount of things, so there would be nothing left to fight over.  Everyone would have an equal opportunity to become successful.  There would be no more poor people and no more rich people; everyone would just have the same amount of wealth.  Every child would have the same level of education.  No one’s child would get a better education than anyone else’s and they would all have an equal opportunity to become successful.  Everyone would have food, shelter and water and everything else they need to survive.  There would be no people living on the streets or starving.  This would make for a much happier overall world than we currently have now.  No one would have to worry about finances which would greatly decrease the amount of stress within everyone.  There would most likely be less crime because no one would have to steal just so they could feed themselves or their families.  Fewer drugs would probably be sold because no one would have to do it just to have enough money to make it through the week.  Everyone would be much happier in a completely equal world.  Life would be so much easier for most because they wouldn’t have to worry about whether their loved one is going to die in war, they wouldn’t have to worry about if they are making enough money for the week, or whether they will have a roof over their head at night when they go to bed.       

Equality

Mill’s main argument throughout “Utilitarianism” is how to promote well-being. I think the most defensible theory is equality. However, it some cases it can also be the least defensible. I will touch upon this slightly since my peers covered this in their argument. An example where equality would not be the defensible is the Mother Theresa vs. Nazi Guard argument. Even though in Mill’s terms, they should both be treated equality it terms on well-being, the majority of people’s moral compasses would steer them towards Mother Theresa.

                On the defensible side-I think many people would agree about the importance of equality. Our generation especially is moving towards the side of equality in many aspects of our daily lives such as race, sexual orientation, and multiple other subjects which have been debated for years. I think if you think about it in a logical way, no one person is better than another. If I saw someone with which once would be considered “questionable values”, in danger, I would not hesitate to help them. I think it can be argued that this would be the least defensible for those who did not grow up in our generation; however, I can slowly even see that generation moving towards equality. I think equality is a very important factor of well-being. Not only in emergency situations, but the idea of being treated fairly and not being judged based off of predisposed quality. 

Equality

            Considering the theories of goodness and intrinsic value, I think the theory that is most defensible is the theory about equality. Following Mill’s Utilitarianism, pleasure is the ultimate goal we should be aiming for. We need to maximize the good and minimize the bad. With equality, these two outcomes could be very possible. If the good was equally dispersed among everyone, than no one would feel left out or unjustly served. Some people do good deeds that interfere with someone else’s pleasures. This can’t happen with the equality theory because everyone’s well-being would have to be equal. This directly correlates with minimizing the bad because it prevents people from suffering from other people’s decisions.

A case against the equality of everyone’s well-being would obviously be if someone was more moral than someone else then they deserve more “units” of well-being. This objection might be convincing, but you can make an argument against it. The simple argument is common humanity, which means that all humans are equally humans so we should all be treated the same. Furthermore, if that didn't convince you then why couldn't something nonhuman like an animal have more well-being if it acted more moral than a human? In this case, does the animal deserve more “units” of well-being? This notion seems a little absurd, but Jeremy Bentham, a British philosopher, will argue that animals suffer so they should relevant. He says, “But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old."

An objection against that comes from Christine Korsgaard, a philosopher, who thinks that “humans face normativity and non-humans don’t.” Humans are conscious of their decisions and passions and think about them. Animals are not conscious of their behavior; they can’t think like we do. Korsgaard also says, “Since non-humans do not act on reasons they do not have a practical identity from which they reflect and for which they act.” Basically there’s a lot of controversy in animals being relevant in the case of utilitarianism. Humanity means human, so the words alone of common humanity don’t refer to animals, which makes it a more reassuring argument.  

Mental States and Goodness

            I believe well-being on its own to be the greatest intrinsic goodness, with other theories acting primarily as tools for distributing or presenting well-being. For instance, equality in measuring well-being appears good only when comparing one situation to another. If I had 50 units of well-being, and someone else had 70 units, though neither of us knew the other existed, and I did not even know that it was possible to have that many units, I would be no more or less content with my well-being than I would if the other person had an equal amount as me, making that lack of equality irrelevant. This is even more true of narrative flow, as describing something as “getting better” or “getting worse” is entirely dependent on making a comparison. If I decreased from 50 units to 30 units, then 30 units would seem to be less good than it would if I had started with 30 units and retained that same amount over the same length of time. Both of these examples rely on a preexisting status of well-being, which is then affected by the individual’s awareness and the context of the well-being. If well-being is required before equality or narrative flow can occur at all, and then the end result which determines the goodness of that equality or narrative goodness is also well-being, well-being would have to be more pure or basic. (I feel like it wouldn’t make sense to say “more intrinsic”, but that is kind of what I’m going for.)

More specifically, the mental state theory of well-being seems more acceptable than either the desire satisfaction or the objective list theories since the acknowledgment of goodness coincides with a positive mental state. If a desire were satisfied, but did not result in a positive mental state, it would be difficult for the person experiencing this to acknowledge that goal being met as intrinsically good. Something considered intrinsically good would not hold much value as being good if it could not be properly appreciated. 

Blog 4

The general theory we have been learning about in class recently is the main human goal is to increase all good outcomes and minimize the bad; however there has been much debate over what this “good” actually is. I believe that the most defensible theory of goodness is Mills’ theory of well being. Although this theory has its objections, it addresses them head on. Also, other theories of goodness addressed in class seem to collapse into Mills’ theory when simplified. This theory basically states that the well being of a human depends largely on their mental states, and in order to achieve “goodness”, one’s mental states must be pleasurable consisting of higher and lower pleasures. The main objection to this theory is a scenario where a person does not know a truth to something that could make his life not good unhappy. It’s suggested that this truth does not make his life good although his mental state is pleasurable and happy. The response to said objection is that not actually knowing this horrid truth is more good to the person than not because ignorance is bliss. In the long run, the more the individual stays unaware of this truth, the better off the individual’s well being is.

Other theories that oppose Mills’ theory of well being are merely external fulfillment's that when satisfied, creates intrinsic feelings of pleasure and well-being. The opposing desire satisfaction theory suggests that goodness comes when your desires are met, yet if a person has all their external desires satisfied, is he or she not happy? Of course they are, their mental states are then pleasurable. The theory of the objective list view states that a person achieves well being when they have a number of things in their life, such as pleasure, satisfied desires, achievement, and more. But who is to tell a person what is good for them other than themselves? There is no greater being who has so much knowledge and well being to create such a list and command that everyone must live like that in order to create a good life. On the other hand, if this list is determined individually, then it would satisfy all the desires of that individual purpose thus giving that person a pleasurable mental state and in turn “goodness”. Both of these objective external theories, when simplified, fold into Mills’ theory of well being.

Equality and Happiness

Of the theories we spoke about in class, that of equality is the most justifiable. We could see quite clearly in the wellbeing example with the ten unidentified people that equality among people can stand up to a greater quantity of wellbeing for one individual, albeit up to a point. The reason why equality is accepted as something intrinsically good is that, by either being all inclusive or exclusive, it does not any more hinder someone from achieving happiness than it does another person. In other words, all things being equal, people have the same chance of attaining happiness, and whether or not it is fully achieved would be based on their decisions.

Consider a scenario in which all the citizens of a town rely on one supermarket for their food. The store is meagerly stocked at best, and every day a tenth of the town’s population does not need their minimum nutritional requirements. If the store owner allowed entry to the store by social status or degree of education, and if these restrictions benefited the community somehow by increasing the likelihood of survival among the “elite,” it would be considered a bad or immoral choice. The reason for this is that it would diminish the ability of those who got the short end of the stick to achieve happiness. Obstructing one’s happiness by stripping away one’s choice both immoral and against the utilitarian view of increasing the amount of good.

If someone were to argue that, if the overall benefits of the store owner’s decision outweighed the suffering of the tenth, then the store owner’s decision is a good one, I would disagree. It is not good to prevent a person from attaining happiness for the sake of the community, because there is no reason why someone should have a greater opportunity for happiness than another person. No one is born more deserving than another; we are all equally human beings. Whether or not someone deserves goodness or equality, harking back to the Mother Theresa and Nazi Guards in-class scenario, is another matter entirely, and one which will not be discussed here. However, desert it not a matter or birthright, but a matter of one’s decisions throughout life. Returning to the scenario, I would say the right thing for the owner to do would be to allow entry to everyone, and for each person to decide for himself or herself whether s/he would be willing to wake up early enough to go to the market to buy food. In this scenario, whether or not a person and his or her dependents are among the suffering tenth is directly dependent on a choice.

Narrative Flow (aka why I wish I was Harry Potter)

            I think we’re more attracted to the idea of having a happy, rich narrative flow to our lives than to the other theories of well-being.

            When we think about the mental state theory, we are initially attracted to it because, after all, who doesn’t want pleasure?  But the “experience machine” objection shows that pleasure is not our main goal.  We are not simply trying to experience happy mental states, but we are trying to live a life where we actually accomplish, fail, achieve, forge bonds with others – a life that has a narrative flow.  “There once was a person who decided to get on an experience machine.  The End.” does not make for a good story.  Furthermore, objections such as “only seeking pleasure is swinish” and even the rejoinder that “the quality of pleasure matters” show that we value pleasure only within the larger context of our lives.  For example, pleasure that we get from knowledge as we learn throughout our lives is more valuable than the pleasure we would get if we sat around and smoked pot for the rest of our lives because we grow and create a richer narrative flow when we learn.

            When we think about the desire-satisfaction theory, we are initially attracted to it because having our desires satisfied sounds attractive too.  However, the “Castaway” objection shows that our life doesn’t get better simply because our desires are satisfied – our life narrative does not become richer for it.

            The objective list theory states specific things that would improve our lives.  Yet I think we would be willing to trade many of these things for part of our lives in order to have a richer narrative flow to our lives.

            Harry Potter probably did not experience much freedom, beauty, equality, pleasurable mental states, desire-satisfaction or any of the things on the objective list for the first part of his life in the cupboard under the stairs.  Even throughout his journey after his acceptance to Hogwarts, he experiences and witnesses many terrible things such as the loss of his friends and family members, having valuable things taken from him, murders, and more.  However, in the end, he can look back and see how he conquered challenges, forged relationships, and lived a life worth telling people about (in the form of seven books and eight movies).  Although as an average person who grew up in suburbia I have probably experienced more equality, a sense of getting my just deserts, pleasure, desire-satisfaction, etc. and experienced less tragedy more consistently than Harry Potter did, I do not think it would be too difficult of a decision for me and a lot of others to choose between my life and a life with a narrative like that of Harry Potter’s.

Pleasure and Phanerons

The theory of good that I think is most defensible is the mental state theory wherein pleasure is the one and only great good that should be strived for. The popular objection of “the experience machine” tries to reduce this view to an absurdity, but it doesn’t seem to hold up to rejoinder. The world around us may exist, but regardless we do not experience it directly. Our sense receptors send signals to our brain, which conjures an imaginary image in our head. Whether or not the world exists, what we experience is a product of the “screen between our ears” which has been dubbed the phaneron. It has been proven well enough that human sensation is not entirely accurate by noting the differences in how we experience things (individual humans tend to be reliable/precise creatures, but not valid/accurate ones)*. Since our phaneron is all we will ever know, there is no reason not to maximize the pleasure of our experience within it. After all, the directors of our movie are serotonin and dopamine. Although the tricked businessman objection seems improbable, it can be addressed regardless. If a man is happy because he thinks his wife is loyal and job is steady and kids love him, it does not matter if none of that is true. Within the realm of his phaneron, those things ARE true. As far as the matrix goes, it doesn’t matter if robots are using your bodies as batteries, just be happy that you think you’re eating steak and drinking wine. And if you disagree? You’d still never know the difference.

*I use the terms reliable and valid akin to the ability of a test to have consistent and correct results respectively, just as a targeting mechanism can be precise (consistent) but not accurate (correct).

Blog Post 4- equality

I would argue that the theory of equality is the most defensible of the theories of goodness and intrinsic value.  Every person's interests should be considered equally.  Every person counts as one and no one should be counted more than someone else.  The best way to maximize the good and minimize the bad would be to regard everyone equally.  The distributes the good more evenly and fairly.  When regarding the interests of each person, it is however important to take into account what these interests are.  Not every interest should be regarded as equal.  If the interests of one individual sacrifices the interests of another or the happiness of another, it should not be taken into account.  This helps to maximize the good and minimize the bad.  If we look at the example brought up in class in which Mother Theresa had 91 units of well-being and the nine Nazis only had one unit of well-being each, this would not be fair if all of their interests are morally good.  If satisfying all of their interests doesn't risk the interests of someone else, all ten of them should be regarded as equal.  If the interests of the nine Nazis put other people's risks in jeopardy than it would be fair to deny them of that.  On the basis of equality, no one can expect another person to satisfy their interests or desires if it puts their own in jeopardy.  Equal treatment of everyone requires that every person "claims a fair portion."  It does not imply that all interests "have the same weight in disposal."

Equality

I'll say that equality is the easiest to defend for the obvious, grey area, and labels that create moral cases. The example in class was a perfect example and being apart of it I understood what was going on. I would say this is a great example to portray equality. I will be referring to that example many times in this defense, along with arguing why it may be weak at certain times. So to start it off I will talk about World A and World B when the people weren't given titles (Mother Teresa, Nazi Guards).

I think this was an easy decision. The more well-being there is divided among the population the better the world is because everyone is equal in well-being instead of one person drowning in his well-being. Both worlds had equal total well-being, but B had more equality among it's people. As B decreased in overall well-being, I and other classmates became more reluctant to pick B and crossed into the grey area.  

The grey area depends on one's level of tolerance. When B got to a well-being of 50, that became a much less prosperous world, but it is still better off due to a slightly better well-being divided among the population. The grey area becomes apparent when we knock each of the 10 people down 1 more peg. I'd have to say 4 or lower is when people would start saying A is better because everyone in B is essentially the same as everyone in A well-being wise, but just a tad better off. I'd much rather have someone who has 91 and 9 others have 1 compared to 10 people with a well-being of 3. This is when equality will not win in the end. Any sane person will pick A over B if A was unchanged and B had all people at 1 and it being equal. Then equality will not win in this case of well-being. But when the decision is easy, like 10 people with a well-being of 10. Then we are fine and one should go with B based off of equality among the people. As you lower everyone equally in well-being, people will eventually move to world A over B. But then it becomes a different story when labels are used.

Now when you put labels on the people, like with Mother Teresa and the Nazi guards, then the argument against equality starts being attacked with the obviousness of morality. Someone who truly views everyone as equal and would look over the atrocities of the guards, then that person would pick B over A. All if not most morally "correct" people will pick A because they would think Mother Teresa is much more deserving of a better well-being compared to Nazi guards.

I wouldn't say equality is the easiest to positively defend seeing that clear cut cases are a small percent of the overall picture, but when it comes to the grey area, and labels due to the clashing of ideals and such, thats when the decision will be determined based on tolerance and moral standings, if any in the situation.

Blog post #4

Post to the blog by Wednesday night at 11:00 PM.  Consider theories of goodness and intrinsic value of the sort we have been discussing in class through today.  Which theory is most defensible, and why?

Significance of utilitarianism

            I’m not sure that I understand Mill’s explanation of the significance of utilitarianism.

            Mill notes that despite the many different doctrines that have existed throughout the ages, the principle of utility has been the underlying principle for these doctrines and is the "standard not recognised" that is responsible for the steadiness or consistency of these doctrines.  Therefore, these doctrines reduce to utilitarianism.  He even seems to casually imply that the concept of not violating rights in order to increase happiness (which sounds somewhat like deontology) is compatible with utilitarianism when he states:

except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of anyone else…

However, if all of these doctrines are just utilitarianism at the core and everyone is interested in maximizing happiness whether they think that they are or not, then it does not make sense to argue that one should be trying to maximize happiness because everyone already is trying to do so.  In other words, he is not really introducing anything new if all he is saying is that “you misunderstood what utilitarianism is, and you in fact agree with it all along”.  Of course, if all he were trying to do is to show people that they are actually utilitarians, then he succeeded considering all the time he spends explaining that objectors disagree with a false version of utilitarianism but not with the actual version – but I think he is trying to do more than that and show that utilitarianism is actually a different way of thinking about morality.

            I think one of his attempts to show that utilitarianism is a different way of thinking and that it can lead to different conclusions is seen in his statement that motive does not matter at all because it is ultimately utility that matters and not the motive.  However, I do not think even Mill agrees with this statement.  For example, in his discussion of the martyr objection, he states:

All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.

To me, this seems to show that Mill thinks the purpose (or motive) for which someone sacrifices his own happiness actually matters and that one purpose is deserving of admiration and morally worthy while another not.  If he did not think purpose mattered, he would have said “he who does it [abnegate personal enjoyment] and does not increase the amount of happiness in the world” rather than “he who does it… for any other purpose”.  Furthermore, it is possible that a person who sacrifices without trying to increase happiness inadvertently does so in which case he would be worthy of admiration.  The language Mill uses strongly suggests that motive matters.

            He later explicitly says that “He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble”, but again I find it hard to believe that he truly thinks this.  First, he later says that motive does have “much [to do] with the worth of the agent”.  Where else could this difference in worth have come from besides motive if the two people are performing the same moral action?  Motive has to matter for the worth of the agent to be different.  Second, to me, it seems that he is simply confusing the definitions of “right” and “wrong”.  There is one sense in which right and wrong can be used to describe an action as one that is virtuous or wicked, and there is a sense in which it can be used to describe an action as correct or incorrect.  In the drowning example, both people take the correct action in saving a drowning person in that the action resulted in increasing happiness, but one is more virtuous while the other more wicked.  However, Mill does not distinguish between these two definitions and uses “morally right” to describe an action that is correct.  Ultimately, this “difference” between utilitarianism and other ways of thinking seems to be based on misuse of the phrases “morally right” and “morally wrong”.

-Sorry for the late post - it took me a really really long time to figure out how to put my jumbled thoughts into writing.  It is also really long, so sorry about that too!

Utilitarianism and Revolution

My question is to what extent John Stuart Mill’s theory supports a revolution. My basis is Mill’s theory’s focus on happiness for every individual. Mill makes happiness essential to any ethical theory. He also argues that care for all people in a society is essential to this sense of morality i.e. ones own happiness is not uniquely important compared to others. From this perspective I think it’s the moral obligation of citizens to revolt against a system that deprives happiness from most citizens. This deprivation is often constituted in lack of necessities like food and shelter – the same things Mill cites as essential and morally significant. I think that our current society deprives people of necessities. So I think Mill’s theory calls for a revolution.

            The most apparent objections to this revolutionary idea are that most people are happy or that the population can be brought to a state of happiness without a revolution. The first objection is a matter of empirical evidence and I don’t think that it need be taken seriously. Serious problems such as poverty, racism, sexism, Orientalism and War make the failings of current society obvious. The second objection is far more understandable, especially from the perspective of someone living happily right now. So it deserves serious rebuttal.

At least in rhetoric the modern day is close to what people want in their lives – Freedom, safety, stability and in a framework capable of individual change. However, I think there is legitimate reason to believe that anything short of radical change will still leave large parts of the population in want – of their necessities especially. It is certainly not impossible to imagine that congress, financiers and other business elites could distribute the great abundance of today in a manner that would alleviate suffering. This would obviously promote happiness, but I think it is a pipe dream counter to the historical precedent. I think it’s counter to historical precedent because there is a pattern of concession – as opposed to real change – when great social movements demand change. Tracing the history of the United States there are many examples. The white slave owners were happy to withhold the rights of black people and women and this system was accepted because white men were decision makers. As slavery was ending there were similar decisions made about the rights of black people (Dred Scott) that gave slight benefit to white men again. As a result of the civil rights movement segregation was ended but this failed to end racism in America, instead creating a more complex and ‘colorblind’ system of oppression. This is also apparent in the gay rights movement where gay marriage has become the centerpiece for most activism and the larger discussion regarding gender and sexuality are marginalized. This system of concession acts to marginalize and stratify movements, thus maintaining the status quo and preventing the kind of radical change (possible but unprecedented) necessary to give most people the life Mill would deem happy.