The Intrinsic Moral Compass

In the argument against moral relativity, the author of “Ethics and Religion: Moral Relativity” contends that a person who does not accept the existence of an objective moral truth would therefore believe that there is “no objective, culturally independent standard by which to judge the moral code of a culture” (15). Having no picture of what is objectively right or wrong, this person then “cannot criticize another culture’s practices” or even one’s own culture (16). It seems that the argument the author is making is that, because there is no concrete moral truth, each culture’s moral code is “right” in its own sense and none can say it is wrong because there is no true sense of wrongness. This argument seems to be sound; however, it relies that such a person would not believe that at least some acts are undoubtedly immoral. This is very unlikely.

Humans cannot create an idea that we have not either experienced or felt; we are limited by what exists. It is impossible for rightness and wrongness to only be an imagined concept, because there is nothing so similar to it from which we could draw. Thus, although one may not believe in an objective moral truth, one would still recognize the idea of rightness and wrongness, because if one did not, the question of morality would not exist. Since humans possess this idea, it is implied that they have an intrinsic moral compass. Because of the moral compass, certain actions would be considered to be naturally good or naturally evil, however broad the idea. For instance, one might not be able to discern whether giving money to the poor or sending your mother on a vacation is the better moral choice, but one would discern that each would be morally better than spending the money on buying a flashy car. Thus, a person would be able to criticize the moral code of a culture, because he or she would be appealing to his or her intrinsic moral compass.

Response to Ethics and Religion; Moral Relativism

The author of “Ethics and Religion; Moral Relativism”, is in the midst of arguing against the necessity of religion for morality on page 11. He provides a counter argument to the idea of living without moral codes since there may be no judgment after death leading to an afterlife; he claims that this argument assumes that as long as people appear good, it doesn't matter if their intentions were good. Put another way, his qualm with the argument is that it implies somebody can do something good with bad (or selfish) intentions and still be considered good. For example, the author believes that a man who rescues a child from a burning house so that he can get onto the news has not acted morally. I do not agree with the author on this point. The argument he is attempting to counterpoint assumes an atheist stance, but he goes on to list reasons why God would not operate in such a way to consider our hypothetical man’s actions morals. When faced with an argument based in an atheist reality, it doesn't make sense to follow that argument with “but that isn’t how God operates”. Used in this way, the author was blatantly committing an appeal to authority fallacy. Even though he cites Christian scripture to support his ideas on how God would think, this act itself contradicts both his later discussion on cultural relativism (if he failed to argue against it) and one of his major points against the argument for the connection between religion and morality (how can we really know what God thinks? [pg 9 bottom])

I also do think that he failed to support his argument against cultural relativism. By way of committing a false analogy fallacy, he gives this example; there used to be disagreement between cultures over whether the earth revolved around the sun or the sun around the earth…just because there is a disagreement over it does not mean that both cultures ideas deserve to exist, because there is an objective truth… therefore, just because there is disagreement about what is and is not moral does not mean that every culture gets a vote, but instead there is one objective moral truth that can be found through enough reasoning. I don’t think this analogy holds water because gravitational orbits in space are mathematical and physical realities, whereas morals are just a vague and somewhat malleable invented concept.

The Origin of Regulation

            Within “Ethics and Religion; Moral Relativism”, the author compares the diversity in different cultures’ ethical views to the diversity in the rules of various sports. However, this analogy does not seem to be entirely accurate. The author claims that even though different sports have different rules, there are common rules within each game that are taken for granted, citing examples like being forbidden to use assassins or being forbidden to use explosives (14). However, many of these larger rules are taken for granted because they belong to a higher code than that of the individual sport. For instance, the rule of being forbidden to throw explosives at the other team is taken for granted because it comes from the legal system rather than from the game itself. If a player purposefully killed another player during a game, they would not simply receive a yellow card, they would be arrested.

            This does not relate to the subject of cultural morality, since there is currently no set of rules or enforcement above it. Every rule that is shared by multiple cultures is decided upon by each of those cultures individually. If, for example, every single country claims that murder is illegal, every one of those countries actively chooses to put that law in place, without a larger authority enforcing it. One could object by claiming that cultures like America have a tendency to enforce their own laws within other cultures, though even in that case America is not in control because it’s more ethically enlightened, or because its views hold more moral weight; it maintains its control through force. Ultimately, the commonalities within different sports are predetermined and preserved by a higher force, while this higher force does not exist among different cultures, making the author’s analogy ineffective.

Blog post #2

Post to the blog about the next reading ("Ethics and Religion; Ethical Relativism") by Wednesday night at 11:00 PM.  Your blog post should either (a) raise and support an objection to something in the reading, or (b) raise and support a fresh argument in support of something in the reading.

Some Considerations

In this piece Singer attempts to draw some connection between suffering and morality and for his main argument demands that the reader (an affluent member of the world) is morally compelled to reduce the suffering of others as long as this does not require heavy sacrifice. Looking at the argument, I believe that most people can agree that suffering is not desirable. Even a masochist would probably consider slow death by starvation and disease morally wrong. Although some people would disagree with the notion that we should make small sacrifices, the amount that singer asks is seemingly insignificant (~$10). Furthermore, because of the sheer difference such a contribution could make, Singer argues that we are morally compelled to donate. Singer's argument is valid, although whether or not it is sound is up for debate. It can be argued that while not as destitute that those suffering as refugees, there are a good amount of individuals who are barely above the poverty line, and perhaps for these individuals such a contribution may be asking for too much.

As for Singer's intended target audience, the middle class of the world, I feel like his argument would be stronger if he tried to personalize the refugees in need of support. Similar to how Singer states how he (or anyone else) would pull someone out of the mud he needs to show that the refugees receiving aid would be directly benefited by the contributions. UNICEF is very effective at this by giving the recipients of the aid an actual face and making calculations regarding how much it would take to feed a child (pocket change to those in industrialized nations).

Response to Singer Reading

I believe that Singer’s three premises lead to a reasonable conclusion.  I believe that if all the premises are true it is a sound argument.  The piece is quite convincing because most of it is very clear and anticipates counterarguments.  For example, Singer pokes apart the possible counterargument that overpopulation in Bengal will come as a result of suffering, an ad consequentiam argument by posing the alternative of population control.  The problem I have with Singer’s argument is the third premise. 

I agree with Singer’s first premise, and do not have a problem with the fact that he does not spend time justifying it.  Like the first premise, the second is easy to follow, but it is more difficult to defend, and requires evidence, which Singer provides.  However, Singer does not establish parameters to the “moral significance” other than anything that can prevent suffering as explained in the first premise.  I believe he should have done so in the third premise.  Singer provides the example of helping refugees in Bengal to center his argument, and provides situations in which people may not understand when morality is used.  I do not think these examples are enough of a clarification.  I found it unclear what exactly Singer’s end goal is for his individual readers.

He cites examples to establish the contexts in which people feel moral, and argues that morality should not be confines as Ursmon and SIdgwick argue.  I side more with Urmson and Sidgwick, who believe that moral codes must not be too strict to break.  I do not believe that should be an excuse for weak morals, however, it is difficult to determine what steps to take to work towards preventing suffering and death other than donating money.  When do we know if we have completely fulfilled our moral responsibility?  How many causes should we individually contribute to? How to we ensure we are aware situations in which there is death and lack of food shelter and medical care? Which place takes priority?  For this reason, the premise I find to be the weakest is Singer’s third.  Though he knocks down potential counterarguments, he still does not cover when exactly our contributions are adequate.  He argues that it is morally sound to donate, but does not establish the parameters in which we are successful at accomplishing that.  Though Singer disagrees with Urmson and Sidgwick, people do respond to clear parameters.   He addresses my concern by saying that people might find this to be too much of a “drastic change” (236).  I do not find it to be too drastic, but to rather unclear as to how I as an individual can employ his advice towards a more sound morality.  Is it enough to donate to the refugees in Bengal?

 

Criteria for Charity

In Singer's Famine, Affluence, and Morality he makes some great points. A point the really stuck out to me was on page 235, "Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned." This point really made me think about how much we are encouraged to donate and volunteer to help the less fortunate. If charity is so highly thought of why do we not donate time and money more often? I wish there was more of a push on people to do charity. Singer goes on to say on page 235 that we ought not to buy clothes that we do not need to keep us warm. I want to agree with Singer on this point. In theory it sounds great where we would not live lives of excess and only spend what we need to and help others. However, in practice this would never work what with everyone's different points of views and different desires in lifestyles. Singer ends this paragraph that I have been focusing on by saying "we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so" (235). Tying this all in I believe that there should be more of a stigma placed on people that do not participate in charitable actions. Why is it acceptable to not be charitable? If it is such a great action we should encourage people to do more and maybe look down on those who do not participate. My only problem with putting this thought into theory is where to draw the line as to what is acceptable Charity or not. I would not know where to say who had to donate what money or how much time in order to be considered "off the hook." But that is part of the problem we have with blaming those who are not charitable. I think as a society we are afraid to tell people that they must do certain things in order to be morally right when we cannot even place a criteria for it. Also, I feel it is tough because we do not know the personal issues of people and how much money they can donate or even if they have donated. People often do not talk about their charitable actions because they do not want to seem like they are bragging and did the action for the attention.

Famine, Affluence, and Morality

At first glance, Singer’s main argument in Famine, Affluence, and Morality seems to be a sound one. The premises of his central argument are hard to disagree with; especially the preliminary assumption that he bases his entire argument off of. This presumption or what most people would call an undeniable truth is that, “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” [230].  From there, Singer asserts that if it is within one’s financial means and ability to prevent the suffering of another (from the bad things listed above) then, one morally “ought” to do so. His argument follows the typical transitive property logic. The logic is simple and the reasoning makes sense. However, I think that his argument is only sound when it is applied to a specific cause (i.e. the suffering in East Bengal) because one cannot donate to every single cause in the world. I think the logic behind Singer’s “global village” concept and “drowning child” scenario is flawed [232].  Singer says that people are “more likely” to assist those who are geographically closer to themselves; thereby, neglecting those who are further away and in need [232].  This may be an accurate assumption; however, it neglects to take into account the positive impacts that the relationship between proximity and aid can have on human suffering. Furthermore this “likelihood” logic for aid can be used to construct an argument against him. Someone could make the “charity starts at the home” argument by arguing that suffering people in other countries also have neighbors that are “more likely” to help them. Thus, if everyone helps those in need closest to them, then the urgency and degree of need for foreign aid should decrease.  If one does not discriminate geographically, then how should one go about choosing the sufferings in which they will help to prevent? Singer’s argument fails to answer this important question. 

Famine, Affluence, and Morality

Peter Singer states in Famine, Affluence, and Morality "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (231).  He later follows this statement up by saying we should help those far away from us not just the ones who are close to us (232).  I agree that it is right to help people in need but I do not agree that we should help those far away before we have helped those who are close to us and live in our own country.  We should take care of the ones in our own country and make sure they are all have food, water, and shelter before we worry about the people from some other country.  There are many people in America that are suffering from famine and have no shelter.  We should not send money to help those far away when we can use that money to help the ones close to us first.  Once everyone within the United States is well fed and has somewhere to live then I do believe we should help others.  There are plenty of children in our own country who live on the streets because they have nowhere else to go and we send money to people from somewhere else money to make sure they have shelter, this is wrong and should not happen.  The people here suffer just as much as those from another country.  We need to put the needs of “our” people before the needs of others.  Once we have helped every single person get off the street and living somewhere with a roof here we should not worry about people from a different country.  Those in this country should be our first priority.  

What makes one thing as morally significant as another thing?

Any cause that urges someone to get off their back side and do something costly (even if only slightly) has the curious tendency of warranting lots of push back. Such is the argument Peter Singer presents in his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” of our moral obligation to help those suffering and dying around the world. I cannot help but feeling defensive going through such a read, not only because of how guilty it makes me feel about my lifestyle, but even more so because I know he is right. Regardless of how it makes me feel or its implications for my life, I have to say it is a valid argument.  It has three main premises; suffering and death is bad, we have the moral obligation to help those in such circumstances if we can, and finally he claims we do have the ability to help those suffering and dying. From these premises it naturally follows that we morally, then, ought to help those suffering and dying. However, this argument does leave room for some ambiguity. For example, Singer claims we should be as charitable as possible without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance (232), but does not clarify what constitutes something as morally significant as another thing. Let’s say my family dog needs a $1000 operation on its stomach or else it will die. At the same time in Ethiopia there are five children who need to be sponsored at a total cost of $1000 dollars or else they will not get the resources they need to survive. According to Singer, distance is not something that takes away from moral obligation, so it is as if these children were my next door neighbors. Then again, my dog is a deeply loved part of the family; but still just a dog. Which case takes precedence? One might jump to say the children should get the money, but when considering how irrelevant to our lives they are, distance seems to have weight in the equation after all. This example may be a little unusual but demonstrates how there are grey areas in an argument Singer presents in a black and white tone. 

When to Stop Lending a Helping Hand

In Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, he states that if it is our power to prevent something bad without suffering anything of comparable moral significance, that we morally ought to do it.

I agree with this statement. However, I would also add reasons as to why helping others from another country – people we do not know personally – is a moral obligation. An analogy I would use would involve families. In a family, we are taught to be united because we bound together by blood. We grow up protecting our family regardless of our circumstances and the situation they are in. Similarly, helping out others in the world is essentially the same thing on a larger scale. Like families, we were assigned to wherever we were. Also like families, we protect and look out for one another. The only difference between these two scenarios, if anything, is that we will pay closer attention to our immediate families as opposed to our extended families.

However, concerning Singer’s method of solving problems, which would be to have each country donate a certain amount until they are at marginal utility is a bit absurd. While I believed that all countries should help one another out in a time of need, I think it shouldn’t mean that all countries should put themselves at a disadvantage because of that. This method follows a very communist like mindset, which puts everyone at an equal disadvantage. This, in my opinion will cause the entire world to suffer in the long run should this ever happen. Having said that, a donation until marginal utility seems like it would be superfluous and unnecessary, especially from every country. The notion that every country should be breaking even to stop the crisis is not a bad one, but realistically speaking, Singer should draw a line as to when donations will be enough, and also, what would happen if crises happened frequently; would every country then be forking out money at every crisis? 

Response to Famine, Affluence, and Morality

In Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer argues that "we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance" (238), and that we have to change how we look at moral issues in order to make the decisions and to act upon the decision to prevent suffering (229-230). I agree with his statement but I also think that his statement is impractical. For example, on page 232, he raises a good point about how technology developed by human beings allows us not to make any excuses of distance being an obstacle to help someone who is suffering outside our local community. This may be true, but as he says “for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited,” (232) people who had been making excuses to not care outside of community would probably consider those technologies as something to make their life more convenient, and not as something to help others who are suffering. That is why those technologies are still unrecognized, and as long as it remains this way his argument that technology can allow more people to help is not a sound argument. And since he also argues on page 242 that acting upon it is more important than discussion, his conclusion about preventing suffering is not supported by his other conclusion about a philosopher. His conclusion lacks ‘how to act’ aspect. Who is to decide what is more morally important than others? Everyone has different values about their life and what is important to them. Everyone has different definition to the word ‘moral.’ By having a subjective aspect in the conclusion, it weakens the conclusion. 

Response to Singer

Peter Singer offers a follow up to his premise that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” by arguing that with the resources available area able to do so (Singer 231- 232). Due to the phenomenal rate of globalization every geographical region seems to be connected. Singer makes an argument that it does not make a difference whether the person receiving aid is the neighbor or someone overseas (Singer 232). To add on to his point, this rate of increased globalization also links these regions economically. Any change of economic status in a country that is involved in trade directly affects the affluent country. This only adds to the reasoning of why someone ought to support a country overseas facing a disaster such as famine.

After Singer makes a clear point that we should and are capable of supporting, he mentions as to how much aid should be in place. In this point Singer goes to the extreme of applying the strong version of the principle. The strong version, however, does not allow for individuals and families to live beyond necessity. It ultimately deprives them of any luxury and even condemns it. As an example, Singer states that instead of buying new clothes, money should be sent for aid of those dying of hunger. An alternative to such harsh rules would be to have a system that requires one to be forced to give a minimal amount of his wealth without suggesting that spending on luxury is blameworthy. This way a moral system then does not condemn people for going into luxuries that they may sometimes desire. Also, it allows for a steady income for the consumer dependent regions that are challenged with poverty. The steady amount should be a percentage of each individual’s wealth and assets that the individual possesses.

Waste and Distance

I find the core of Singer's argument both sound and valid, but I find his arguments on the irrelevance of distance overly dismissive of a legitimate problem. Singer arrives at the conclusion that since it is bad for people to suffer from death and lack of food, shelter, and medical care, and it is within our capacity to alleviate these problems without giving up anything as morally important, we ought to alleviate this suffering.

Singer notably dismisses distance as a factor for decision-making on the basis that "it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away." (Singer 231) I happen to agree with Singer on this point. It makes no moral difference in itself. But there is a considerable difference when it comes to the implementation of aid. Singer preempts this argument, stating "Expert observers and supervisors... can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block." (232) It is odd to me that Singer would defer the responsibility of appropriate disbursement of funds to these "expert observers and supervisors." Singer seems to argue that it is each of our moral obligation to give aid in the form of money or goods to those whose suffering we can alleviate. Yet he does not address whether it is our moral responsibility to ensure our aid is put to use properly. If it is a moral imperative to donate scarce resources to those lacking the requisite resources to get by, shouldn't it also be a moral imperative to ensure those resources are not squandered, as each dollar or bottle of clean water squandered is a dollar or bottle of water that does not go to those in need? Waste is as morally wrong as outright withholding. With this consideration, Singer's claim that distance is irrelevant no longer holds true. It is much easier to both verify the need of and ensure the proper use of resources closer to me than farther away. It's cheaper too. Singer points to the existence of expert observers and supervisors as a means of administering this aid. But how do I know these observers and supervisors have the moral and intellectual faculties to ideally distribute aid? Thorough and rigorous verification of the professionals who would go relatively unobserved in places far from me would dip into the bucket of funds I could be using more efficiently to care for my neighbor. Although Singer is correct in stating that modern technological advancements have brought the corners of the earth closer together, there are still costs associated with the transportation and disbursement of aid. These costs grow with the distance from the source of the aid. If both those close and those far from me suffer, but I can alleviate the suffering of more close to me due to lower comparative costs, surely my aid would do the most good closer to home.

Marginal Utility

            Although I agree with Singer and the moderate version of his argument, I do not agree when Singer suggests that those in affluent countries ought to reduce their quality of life to close to that of a Bengal refugee.

            When Singer suggests this, it seems to me that he does so because he believes that one of the bad things that we must prevent is inequality itself.  He does not actually say that inequality is the bad thing, but he seems to imply that a dollar is worth more to a person with less money than to a person with more, so only by distributing dollars equally would we reach a point where moving a dollar from one person to another does more harm than good, i.e. the point of marginal utility or the point at which donating would cause “as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift”.

            I agree that donating should be done to a point of marginal utility.  However, I would disagree that this point of marginal utility is reached only once one has reduced their wealth to equal that of a Bengal refugee or until everyone is nearly equal.

            First, quality of life is not directly tied to wealth.  I may look to celebrities who are wealthier than I am and I may wish I had a party yacht at times, but I do not consider my life to be “worse” than theirs simply because of our difference in wealth.  Similarly, it seems likely that there are people who view those in my economic class in the same way.  Therefore, it seems possible that two people can be fairly far apart in terms of pure dollars while having similar levels of life satisfaction.  Of course, this does not mean that Bengal refugees or others in similar situations view basic medical necessities the same way I view a party yacht.  I am simply trying to point out that it is probably better to view quality of life using a threshold (perhaps one involving medical necessities, housing, nutritious food, etc.) than to view it as purely a question of inequality of wealth.  Beyond this threshold, it may be nice to continue giving money, but it does not seem to me to fall under the realm of moral duty.

            Second, there is also a cost to significantly reducing one’s standard of wealth and life.  To use an extreme example of the cost of losing, a person who becomes paralyzed probably suffers more than a person who was born paralyzed.  Similarly, there is also probably a point at which donating an extremely large amount and equalizing one’s standard of living to another person’s may have a cost that outweighs the benefit.  This is not to say that a small reduction in quality of life does not fall within the realm of duty, simply that Singer’s reduction in standard of living seems severe.

            Considering these points, it seems to me that my current donations of 10% of my (admittedly tiny) income is fair to expect of me because if everyone in affluent countries did the same, we could raise everyone’s standard of living and quality of life to an acceptable threshold.  However, a donation that would force me to reduce myself to a state of near poverty seems to go beyond a point of marginal utility and does not seem to me to be a moral requirement.

Blog 1

In his article Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer makes compelling arguments about what is just of an individual, stating that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 231). This principle suggests that if one is financially able to give aid to someone else in need, then it is only right to do so. Singer then goes on and specifies that as a society, the decent thing to do would be to continuously donate until marginal unity is reached. If everyone reaches marginal unity then those who need aid now will soon find themselves existing in under “normal” circumstances.

I cannot help but to question the theoretical end of his idea of morality, and believe that since its not addressed, it creates possible objections to his principles. Singer uses the example of saving a drowning boy as the obvious right choice, without question. The little boy may be drowning, however he also might be a murderer and saving his life would cost lives later on. Saving him would be the accepted act; however is it still considered moral if consequential actions are morally wrong? Relating it back to aid, say a poor family in Bangladesh only needs $5.00 to break out of poverty. Soon they receive $10.00 in donations, putting them above marginal unity. Singer would suggest that the family should then in turn take the residual $5.00 and donate it to someone more impoverished than them, however if they do not then they are acting immorally with the money someone donated. Does this then make the donation immoral? I believe if Singer just addresses the hypothetical “end” of an act of morality, his argument would stand sounder. 

The Bystander Effect

In Singer's article Famine, Affluence and Morality, he highlights the idea that it is morally ought that if we are capable of helping we should do so. Singer mentions one of the main contributing factors to why people do not take initiative in offering the less fortunate aide, can be related to the bystander effect. The bystander effect refers to cases in which individuals do not offer any means of help to a victim when other people are present. This bystander effect is seen within society daily. Singer says “Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing? (233)". I agree that a majority of people in society convince themselves that what they are or are not doing is moral based on the people they surround themselves with.

I believe our country places a high importance on individual rights. However, I think a majority of the way people build their beliefs and morals are based upon friends and family, rather than solely based on their own ideas. Singer’s argument can be separated into two different ideas-the idea that people did not develop their own belief system or the idea that if they know of people who are upholding moral duties, they are less likely to themselves. These ideas can be slightly contradictory, however can overlap also. I do not believe it is correct, however I understand why people are under false pretenses that if so many people they know are donating and upholding good moral standings, and one person cannot make a difference. However, if everybody had those ideas, then nothing would ever progress .

Effect of distance on aid

In Singer’s article Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Singer explains that when a person is in close physical proximity to one’s self, it is often “more likely that we shall assist him” (232); however, “this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away” (232). In stating this, he has implied that physical proximity to an individual, or group of individuals in need should not necessarily influence whether or not we feel a moral obligation to help those individuals, yet it still seems to have an incredible impact.

       Despite the seemingly good argument Singer poses in regards to distance playing a large factor in the lack of aid to Bengal, he also appears to contradict himself. Although distance often influences the speed at which help is received, “instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation” (232), making Singer’s argument less solid. Distance once made it difficult to help those far away from us, but technology has allowed us to tremendously speed up the process of aiding others. Although it does not seem as easy to send money over to Bengal as it would be to hand a homeless person money on the street, in today’s society it can be just as quick. The internet, for instance, has evolved to such a point that one can type in their credit card number then click submit and within about five minutes have sent money to Bengal, the same amount of time it would take for one to pull out their wallet and hand that homeless person money. With that being said, there should be no argument that distance or time has an effect on whether or not one helps others in need, especially when present technology has made sending aid so quick and simple.

Moral Responsibilty: A Flaw In Singer's Argument

          While I do agree with most of Singer’s Argument I believe that he does not adequately explain how his argument that we have no justification for discriminating on geographical grounds is sound. He states that “it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards from or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away”-Singer. After a brief consultation with Richard Schulz I began disagreeing to this statement because your proximity and distance, while existing on a geographical level, can also exist on a moral level. This moral level would be the moral responsibility that one has to a loved one over a stranger. I argue that his example of the little girl that needs saving was well argued, but only under the terms he specified in his example.  I believe that if two girls were to be in distress and the savior had a strong relationship with only one of the girls, then the girl who the savior feels closer to and as a result more morally responsible for would receive the help first.  This disrupts Singer’s argument for the Bengal relief fund because people can be both physically and mentally removed from this situation. If one were to be mentally removed and care more for another charity that is more morally important to them then they can choose to not give to any other charity but the charity they choose. This charity, I add, can be geographically close or far, but regardless there is a choice of one over another. One may argue that you are still giving thus his argument still holds true, but I would disagree because one could use this excuse to give to charity that may not necessarily be on the same level of charity as another and that means that your amount of giving is also different in magnitude and meaning. I believe that when people are geographically removed from a situation they are sometimes emotionally and morally removed as well. Thus a closer situation that directly connects to them is the situation that they would give their support and charity to.    

Response to giving your maximal

I find Peter’s claim on giving your maximal to be validate, but I don’t find it to be true.  The only objection I have is we cannot give maximally to people in need because they will only latch and become dependent on that help. Peter says, “give away enough to ensue that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely.” Even though we would like for this to be true, it never can be. We live in a capitalistic world where we are actually working hard for all of our earnings. Peter’s argument seems to be that of a socialistic world- where a society works hard for their earnings but have the mind-set to actually share those earnings.

Take this example: You have two sheep; you give one to your neighbor. This example exemplifies Peter’s argument in giving maximally to people in need-which is called socialism. I may need that sheep for food, fabric, etc. The idea is that I gave the maximal. Take another example: You have two sheep; you shave them and sell fabric. You neighbor also had two cows- and to maximize your profits, you form and alliance. You both open a shop and distribute the fabric accordingly. This form of society is capitalism, which is exactly what we oblige by. We are groomed by capitalism and most of our nations industries are capitalistic - people working for themselves. We work had because we know we will get rewarded with lots of money, but we would not work as hard knowing that the money we worked hard for was going to famine relief, even though morally we know it is a good thing to do. In a perfect world where everyone’s motivation is to help one another, then yeah Peter’s argument sounds perfect. However, that can never happen since we are self- interest and too greedy for that type of world to exist.

Singer stated that he "would sympathize with someone who thought that campaigning was more important than giving one-self, although he doubts whether preaching what one does not practice would be very effective" (Singer 240). I disagree with the second part of his statement.  Many people are not willing to donate money to charities or organization, whether they be privately owned or operated by the government. An argument that could be used to defend their reluctance to donate money is that it is often unknown how much of the money that is being donated is actually going towards charitable activities.  According to research done by Richard Dyson for "The Telegraph," an English newspaper, the organization "Cancer Research," spends 70% of its annual income on charitable activities 160 of their employees earn over 102,000 dollars a year.  The British Heart Foundation only gives 46% of their annual income to charitable activities.
It could be argued that giving money isn't necessarily the best use of the resources people have to offer.  By offering their time, whether it be by campaigning or by working directly with those in need, people know that what they are doing is making a direct impact.  That is not always the case with donating money. One can contest that giving your time is more morally important since the person donating their time can directly see their impact whereas someone donating money cannot.

A complicated third premise

Peter Singer's main argument in his essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" is an incredibly convincing argument that I am inclined to agree with, but I do not think his argument is unshakable. I am troubled by the third premise of Singer's main argument: "It is in our power to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care without sacrificing anything of [comparable] moral significance (232)." While I agree with this statement in a general sense, this sentences use of "our" leads to a far more complex or, at the very least, unclear distinction that must be made clear.

The way in which we interpret the use of the word "our" complicates Singer's premise. We could take the use of the word "our" in an individual sense (i.e. me as a person) or in a large socio-cultural sense (i.e. The United States of America). I suspect Singer would like both the macro and micro senses of our to be applicable here, but there is a huge gap between what we as the USA can do and what us as individual's can do. As an individual I could give some money to the Bengali Relief Fund and as Singer pointed out, if everyone could give something within their means then we have a tremendous ability to raise money to fix the problem. However, how do we mobilize every individual to give what they can? Provided we can do that, how do we judge who we send the money to first? There are thousands of charities out there, all for very good causes, and now we must decide who to send the money to. I believe Singer would be right in answering my questions here with, "Just because redrawing what is 'charity' and what is 'morally necessary' makes our lives more complicated does not mean that we should not do it. It is the morally right decision to give to the relief fund, even if we have to put other charities on the back burner." My point here is merely that Singer's solution creates a very complicated system that must be clearly explained in order to function and, as Singer suggests, would probably require a great deal of retooling to our culture/society to be accepted.

Returning to my earlier distinction between "micro our" and "macro our," it seems that the problem with "macro our" is that it is difficult for us as people to get our government to act on what we want. For example, it seems entirely possible for the USA to allocate some money from it's military spending budget and put it towards humanitarian work. However, it is very difficult for the people from the bottom to fuel that type of change as a society or, as a citizen of United States, it is unclear to me how I could possibly help create this change. Singer might argue that this point is less an attack on his premise and more a concern with the systemic problems that exist within the U.S., but I think the systemic problems and our ability to act morally are intertwined. It is extremely difficult to act morally in a system that does not promote acting morally and it seems that if we want to be able to redraw the lines between charity and morality, we must first address the systemic problems within our own culture that suppress moral action.

Analysis

After reading Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” his conclusion and point to his argument is quite clear: “If it is our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally to do it” (235). He states his argument in such a way that people may think that finding flaws in his argument makes you a selfish person.  Singer encourages well-off people to use their wealth to help people who are in less fortunate situations. Personally, I agree with Singer’s whole crux of the argument, but I think more scrutiny of details needs to be taken into account.

Let’s say, hypothetically, that wealthy people will read Singer’s argument, agree with it, and follow through on his ideas to donate and help out. Poor people are obviously a group in our society that is suffering; therefore, the affluent people have to help these people. Singer is not very specific with taking into consideration factors like how that person got themselves into that situation in the first place. I am not saying that it is wrong to donate money, but when it comes to money it shouldn't be taken lightly because ultimately money is what makes our world function. The less fortunate are poor for a multiple of reasons. Some are not well off because of a dangerous disease…addiction. Addiction causes some to waste away their money on drugs or even just a shopping problem. Then you ask yourself, “How can it be morally right to donate money to people who will waste their money on such things that will essentially be detrimental to one’s health? To avoid this problem, I think the more affluent people in our society should donate only after you have personally conducted research and investigation to absolutely know where your money is going and if it will be put into good use. Furthermore, maybe just donating food and clothing would be more beneficial than just donating money. 

On the Strong Version of the Principle

Although I agree with Singer’s argument that “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (235), I disagree with his stance on how much we ought to give. Singer offers two methods by which to carry out our moral duty. The moderate one asks that we do what we can, up to the point where we must “sacrifice something morally significant,” while the strong one “require[s] us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, [which] … require[s] reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility” (241). Singer defines this level of marginal utility as “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift” (241). He declares that the moderate version is inferior to the strong version, which is the correct one, although achieving it “would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee” (241). Here is my issue: If we were to follow Singer’s recommended strong version of the principle and become as destitute as the Bengali refugees, what would become of us (229)?

Throughout the article, Singer remarks on how few affluent people are willing to help the less fortunate for the sake of charity, which is more or less considered an optional good in our culture (235). If one does decide to give, already exceeding the moral expectations of society, one has little motivation to give a considerable amount, since a gift of any size is welcomed with gratitude, and as such will typically not do so (237). Hence, it seems that one in need cannot rely on the aid of others and must, if one can, do what is necessary to take care of oneself. By this, I do not mean that one should not give aid to the less fortunate (I have agreed to Singer’s initial argument, as mentioned above), but that one should not give to the extent that Singer holds to be correct, namely that determined by the strong version of the principle. From my understanding on Singer’s article, it would not be correct for someone to have more money in the bank than is needed to satisfy basic physiological requirements; to bolster this argument, Singer quotes Thomas Aquinas, who wrote: “Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance” (qtd. in Singer, 239). However, it is logical to think ahead. Who knows what medical emergency there might be, whether one will have a steady job, or whether one will be paid enough to live in a country where the cost of living is on the rise? Because the future is uncertain, it is wise to prepare for what might happen. Following the strong version of the principle is too great a sacrifice and risk to take.

What he is getting at (I think)

In Peter Singer's "Fame, Affluence, and Morality", Singer explains the progression of one's thought process when dealt with a moral issue. He talks about people making assumptions about donations to the Bengal Relief Fund and how these people would go about donating or not based on these assumptions. He mentions, "If everyone does [donate], however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary" (234) which is superb work if done, but it could cause unneeded harm to the donor and hurt his obligations to his dependents. So he then continues in saying, "If everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do" (234). He mentions this because these confusion causing assumptions are a paradox and "arises only if we assume that the actions in question-sending money to the relief funds-are performed more or less simultaneously" (234) which then creates problems. I will mention that he said earlier in the book, "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (231).

Bringing it all together, I'll start off by saying I agree with the recently aforementioned quote from above. If you are able to do something morally without causing harm to yourself and possibly to others, you should do it. He mentions various scenarios that occur mainly due to the assumptions of the possible donors. It would be great if people chipped in more money than needed and give the Bengal Relief Fund more money than needed, but this should only be done by those who can give more than what is "expected" out of a donor. However, if one starts to assume that everyone is doing that then the potential donors won't donate which will cause those who do donate to donate more and the trend could continue and it could lead to harming the donors and their dependents. Of course we cannot think like this, but a scenario like this was mentioned in the reading that a single assumption can deter someone from donating because others are doing the work for him and so he does not feel morally obligated to donate. If everyone started to think that way, nothing would get done. This cycle can continue and vary on many different levels, so what could be done and is the most logical way and what Singer is getting at is donate what you can. If you cannot donate, then Singer and I agree that's fine as well for "the charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned" (235), but I would hope the non charitable man does not lie about his economic standing to get out of donating even just 1 dollar. If you are in great economic fortune, we'd both hope you donate a lot compared to someone of lesser fortune and it'd all balance out in the end. We all would not have to donate 100 dollars each, but instead maybe 10-20, and like I said even a dollar works as well. Any amount of money donated to a charity can make an impact and I would hope for the better, always.

Response to Famine

     In Singer's piece "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," he mentions that the writers Sidgwick and Urmson propose that if society, or government, etc., places a strict moral code on people that is “beyond the capacities of the ordinary man” (Singer 237), the people will disregard the entirety of the moral code. As an example, he says that if commanded to not murder then people will comply, and if given the option to donate to famine relief some will. However, if forced to both not murder people and to give away most of their livelihood to the famished, then both laws will be disregarded as excessive and people would murder and not donate. Singer claims that this argument fails to take into account the varying moral standards of societies (in our society, giving 5% of all income is seen as extremely charitable, but Singer thinks that is not enough) which are a result of social pressures, and thinks that we can sway the social pressure into a more charitable and non-consumeristic society.

     I disagree. To see an instance of our society responding to what they considered excessive law, simply look to prohibition. Aside from the obvious abundance of liquor smuggling and speakeasies, the rules of the game (society listening to laws) changed. A man like Al Capone was so successful in his outlaw liquor business that he gained the political and societal sway to installing his own mayor. This leads me to my next point. Singer seems to support a large societal mindset shift away from consumerism, but that is unrealistic in American society. Capone and his gang owned Chicago because the people desired what he had, and that is the core of consumerism. Our American society is so heavily rooted in consumerism at this point that an upheaval of that magnitude would lift us out by the root.