What?! Japan needs to be slapped into reality!

First off, everything done in this article is completely unethical and I do not at all agree with any methods used to come to conclusions on the effects of various diseases and illnesses on humans, the testing of chemical weapons, and training of army doctors even if it helped benefit society today and I will mainly talk about how unethical the treatment of people was during this whole smudge on human history.

To start off, there is undeniable evidence that Japan has committed these atrocities. They want to have their pride and deny this and that's somewhat reasonable, but how can you live with the guilt and in fact not accept this? You need to accept that what you have done was wrong so you can move on or else you'll have a stain on your medical record until you do and sure we live in a different time now, but no one will ignore Japan's ugly past. We still rave about Nazi Germany today, 70 years later. I'm actually shocked we don't speak of this in schools. It is just as serious as the WWII genocides, but the US is also in cahoots with this business so I guess let's not make us look more ugly than we already are?


So...

Some of the tests actually weren't bad in means of what they want to accomplish. I wish they were done more humanely, and not such a way that death is basically expected in every test.The elephant in the room is how it was done. There were raids in public areas, where biological warfare testing was done and innocent people would be exposed to the public via charged fleas and testing was done on innocent citizens. Completely inane! EVEN BABIES AND CHILDREN WERE TESTED ON. This isn't even justifiable with "Oh they are condemned criminals, so let's put them to use" and even then it wouldn't be justifiable. Why in the world did they think that any of this was fine. Obviously many did not find it was fine, but whoever made the decision that this was a good thing to do, attack the country's own people, then they are ill in the head! So innocent, literally defined innocent people were harmed by this testing.

Now about the testing in general. Every. Single. Method. They were inhumane, and unethical. I do not care if we found extraordinary results about the endurance of the human body from these experiments. Thousands of people died, and the testing included but is not limited to: getting shot in various environments based off of temperature and pressure, vivisected for medical training, hypothermia, cyanide poisoning, salt overdose, decapitation, death from chemical gases. Many of these tests were carried out so that no matter what a person would die because a group of people were designated as controls. It's hard to put into words how insanely wrong this all was. A human is a human. I don't even consider who they were, you don't go around gathering people who are labeled as basically dead and put them in a room where it's 40 degrees Celsius under 0 and watch what hypothermia does to a human body. BEFORE THIS HAPPENED, one would be able to tell you that you'd die from frostbite and a decrease in body temperature! They even went a step further sending people in with wet clothes or naked. Why... The graphic testimony by Satoru Kurakazu on page 6 of the document is telling enough that these experiments are undeniably unconscionable. To really set the feeling, "They suffered so much agony they were digging their nails into each other's flesh" (Page 6 of Document).

Anything pertaining to disease and illness on the human body, I wish was done in a better way because this is information that can save lives. However, chemical weapons are basically taboo in war, but everyone is just making them anyways in case someone wants to play the blame game when that one country starts using them heavily in war, so let's go ahead and test them and make the most effective chemical weapons! They couldn't at LEAST instead figure out if there's a way to effectively combat these chemical weapons (article never said).  They are made effective based off of human testing, because every human loves a blast of mustard gas to the face to help out Japan. We don't use these weapons anymore! For the love of God, have some consideration! I'm more than certain Ishii wouldn't want to blast people with anthrax if he got a shot of it himself and miraculously lived.

Now we have the medical training. Humans being killed or critically injured by various injuries like being shot or horribly chopped up and then operated on to help treat these injuries, and then if they lived they would continue testing until the human was disposable. Once again, I love the intent behind this if it wasn't done like this. Hands on experience on a dummy, literally a dummy, not a human, would be more ideal. It's not like we are using actual humans in universities just so students can do a surgery on them for hands on experience. I'm certain they perform their first surgery in a hospital. Obviously, completely different from a battlefield scenario, but would you rather kill a human even if his life has been cut short because politicians say so to save a soldier, or do theoretical surgery on a dummy and use your knowledge to save the soldier. One scenario would expect a better success rate than the other I would assume, but is also completely unethical. I do not care if you are a criminal in your country or against the country VIA war, no living being deserves such treatment.

So, if I must explain, why is this all unethical? It is unethical because human beings are being put forced into situations where their life is taken through various methods of deadly torture for medical research. The doctors who perform these devilish deeds aren't even complaining about it immensely because they were pressured into the job by the imperial government. If they denied, their academic record would be destroyed, and it was assumed this would happen (and it probably happened). So they took the safe path and went with the research. Humans are being forced basically against their will to perform experiments on other humans, regardless of who they are, that is equivalent to torture that more times than not result in death. If that isn't unethical, I don't know what is.

The only issue with this article is the use of the word "probably". It was used many times in the article, making it seem very flimsy. However, that can be ignored because there is also so much concrete evidence (mainly from testimonies) saying many atrocities did in fact occur along with the digging up of many skeletons with stab and gunshot wounds in their skulls.

Blog Post 8

I don't believe that the Emperor had no idea what was going on in that division when it was added to the military.  First of all, the Japanese as a society have too much respect and love for their emperor to keep him in the dark and/or deem him not worthy to know.  Secondly, the emperor had main control over the military, it was the "Imperial Japanese Army."  This army is under the nominal command of the emperor.

Not only was the human experimentation morally wrong, but the dehumanization of these people was atrocious. The fact that they were called "logs" and referred to as numbers show that they didn't even regard them as people.  these people were used simply as tools.  People could have been trained to become army surgeons differently but they chose a much less humane way of doing it.  Instead of working with cadavers, preferably willing cadavers, they used unwilling subjects and tortured them to death for the sake of training.  Even after the "logs" were used, they were not given the respect they deserved.  Kasahara, himself stated that he believes that he is the only person to give these test subjects a memorial service.  After torturing, and killing them, the least they could do was give them a proper burial when that could mean so much to them in terms of what happens to their soul.

Accepting truth to avoid repeating same mistakes

I agree with Tsuchiya that Japan lacks medical morality and past mistakes should be discussed more. I grew up in Japan, went through the Japanese education system and yet have never heard that Japanese researchers “killed thousands of humans in medical experiments.” I learned about how badly Japanese soldiers treated and killed Chinese and Korean people in World War II, and other cruel behaviors of Japan’s military to other countries. So it is not that all past behaviors were not taught. I also learned in Japanese history class that it was not till recent that the true history was taught in school because of the Emperor had been thought as a god-like symbol and therefore it could not been admitted that Emperor made wrong decisions. It took a long time after the war ended to have citizens recognize that the Emperor is a human and not a god.

The fact that it has not been discussed seems to reflect Japanese culture in a way that medical issues are not common topics of discussions. As I mentioned in class the other day, not many people talk about abortion and morality, and abortion is done frequently. I wish that Japan will admit past behaviors and clear up medical ethics in order to not make the same mistakes they made as Tsuchiya explain in his article. When people are under high pressure, people tend to lose common sense and act immorally. During war, not only human experimentation but other cruel things were done to other human beings. The pressure to win a war is very high, because you have to kill or be killed. Japan is not involved in war now and not under the same kind of pressure, but now Japan is under high pressure to lead in medical technology and the development of new techniques. Japan has to reflect what has been done in the past in terms of medical experiments to make sure they do not repeat the same mistakes, as it has been done in terms of war. In the case of Hiroshima atomic bomb, Japan is preserving the building that had a big damage, called Hiroshima Peace Memorial or Genbaku Domu, and has museums to keep the record of cruelty of war. Even though it might be easier to preserve the result of Hiroshima atomic bomb because Japan can blame the Americans for such an immoral action, creating a museum and bringing the awareness of such mistakes are key actions to avoid same mistake no matter how hard it is to accept the truth. Accepting the truth of harsh past should not be as hard as experience of going through the cruel actions. 

Unjustifiable Actions

I do not believe there to be any justification for the “medical” experiments or torture inflicted on Chinese citizens, prisoners of wars, or any other human beings. The three main things researched were therapies, diseases, and chemical warfare. It is arguable, but the development of more destructive and painful weaponry is never morally right. Throughout history new weapons were developed and the creator justified it by saying that it would be an end to all warfare, such as TNT. Supposedly the power of a single weapon could either overpower an opponent or bring their morale so low that the weapon was actually one of “peace”. As we can see, this is not the case. The arguments for disease research and therapy research seems more in a gray area. Often test subjects were already destined for execution, and new information about surgery techniques, vaccines, and other medical breakthroughs seem to be doing a lot of good. However, it is never okay to use someone in a way that would harm them for the sake of all. First of all, not all test subjects were criminals or even necessarily enemies of war; some were women, children, and even babies. Also, one cannot argue either from a Kantian or Virtue Ethics perspective that such behavior was permissible; it is not a universalizable action since nobody would be comfortable making such a sacrifice themselves, and although such passions for medical research may be good they were plainly taken to an extreme.

Interestingly, a member of the SS, Adolf Eichmann, stated during his trial that he was acting according to “a Kantian definition of duty” but later retracted the statement, saying that he didn’t “live entirely according to it.” Author Deborah Lipstadt cites this retraction as evidence that evil people are aware of their own immorality.

Human Medical Experimentation: Does the Subject Matter?

     Often, in matters of human exploitation, we believe that abuse is less of a moral issue if the victim is someone like a pedophile, rapist, or murderer who has repeatedly broken the law. For this reason, I will regard these criminals specifically in this essay. While more severe forms of punishment, such as forms of the death penalty, used against like culpable individuals would be more morally permissible due to the nature of their crimes than it would be if they were petty criminals, the more intense and abusive the punishment, the less morally permissible it is for anyone.

     Illegal human exploitation, (sometimes) torture, and poor treatment during medical experimentation, while capable of yielding extremely relevant and important results, is not moral in any account. Humans should not be reduced to the rank of animals and used as little more than lab rats, as was done in this specific case. As compared to severe forms of punishment, treatment of humans in this way is immoral because one treats them against their will as a means to an end. Additionally, abuse of the victim is inappropriate since, in most cases, s/he has not done anything to merit exploitation; the article describes that prisoners of war, some women, children, and even innocent villagers were used in the experiments. In some cases concerning morality, consent makes a difference in the determination of an action’s ethical value; here, it holds no weight. This is because one of the pillars of the victim’s humanity is being denied recognition by the medical experimenters: rationality, which leads to the formation of one’s dreams, desires, goals, and intentions. Ignoring that another human has these aspirations is gravely disrespectful to his/her personhood and dignity.

     However, in strict forms of punishment, a human maintains his/her “end” status as a subject, not an object. The judge is not using the criminal, who is not a victim in this case, for personal gain in this instance. Also, despite the fact that the justice system is not perfect, criminals who do receive severe forms of punishment for their actions ideally deserve their sentences and have had chances in the past to ameliorate themselves. Thus, unlike before, these criminals had a chance in determining their futures. Finally, the criminal, knowing the price for a repeated offense, chooses to forgo his/her dreams, desires, goals, and intentions. Thus, s/he commits a crime unto him/herself.

     In conclusion, it is not the subject who matters, since even the culpable are wronged by exploitative medical experimentation. What does matter, however, is the treatment of the person and the respect towards his/her defining qualities in the destructive act.

Blog Post 8

If you choose to post by Monday night by 11:00 PM, either (a) raise and develop an objection to some moral issue raised in the Tsuchiya reading, OR (b) offer and develop a supporting argument about some moral issue raised in the Tsuchiya reading.

Poly

“Rather, what children ought to do for their parents (and parents for children) depends upon (1) their respective needs, abilities, and resources and (2) the extent to which there is an ongoing friendship between them” (English). So that’s the argument.

Honestly I’m pretty bored by this subject. The answer is either so obvious that it’s a non-answer. That’s how I feel about English by the way. Or it’s just some premise that’s not an argument it’s just some ontological lesson on the importance of filial piety. I’m not interested in the debate as it stands, but I think that’s because I don’t like the atomic family. I don't like the family as it stands. I like English’s reasoning, which boils down to a simple thought. There’s nothing special about parents or kids that warrants obligation. We probably only think that way because we understand obligations or at least friendliness among friends (there’s that obviousness) and family are very likely to become friends. I’d be more interested in a thought experiment to see where I can move this around.

            In a polyamorous family obligations could get very complicated. Say there’s a generation of parents, all equally responsible for raising the children. Now the children, if they are friends with their parents ought to do something, if they have the resources. But wait, if the  group of parents is large enough, taking care of them could be as complex and full of opportunity costs as a small society (let’s go big, at least 100 parents living commune style). Any one person surely couldn’t help the whole family and quite possibly isn’t friendly with everyone! Should we only give medical care to the people we like? What scares me most is that this pans out on a societal level. The state is a paternal idea. It is supposed to help keep infrastructure intact, the world clean (safe to live in at least) and provide medicine and education. Yet I’m not on friendly terms with politicians and I don’t think most anyone is (I’m sure thousands or millions are, but that’s a drop in the bucket of hundreds of millions). And I’m all grown up, so I’m not obliged to anything? What I think I’m getting down to is that treating your parents with the same standards as anyone else is probably a good idea. It’s the way we treat everyone else that needs another look.

Owing Caring Parents

Surprisingly, I find myself thinking about this topic quite often so I was very interested in the readings. As I was reading I found myself torn between the two papers. I really like English's piece and how she says the favors and helping our parents should be based off of our relationship with them, especially when she says that children are not asked to be born. We aren't asked to be born so how can we really owe our parents anything? I feel this is one of her strongest parts of her argument. However, I read Chenyang's piece second and I felt swayed by his piece. His most convincing paragraph was the last paragraph on page 344 and I want to take time and talk about it and add on to it and attempt to strengthen it. Chenyang talks about how most people in general are appreciative of the life they have; in a way life itself is a gift in this way that our parents  have given to us. Some may argue this by saying we did not ask to be born, it was the parents' choice so we still do not owe them anything. However, our parents do so much for that beyond our birth, they sacrifice a lot and with that I believe that we owe them a little bit. I can concede that if a parent abandons their child or does not other sacrifice beyond giving them life that the child does not owe them much. But if your parents sacrifice a lot for you, even if your relationship is not the greatest, you owe them something. I have to argue that if you feel your relationship with your parents is lacking but they still provide for you and care for you then you're relationship with them must not  be that severely lacking. Someone does not sacrifice and provide for someone all of their life if they do not care for them at all, so I would have to argue your parents do care for and love you so your relationship is much better than perceived. If you cannot perform caring acts for someone who loves you and has sacrificed for you then you are being immoral.

Definition of Favor

Jane English and Chenyang Li mainly differ on what they think to be the definition of a favor. On one hand Jane English presents the idea that a favor is simply an act done due to a request made by someone else. However, Chenyang Li writes that not all favors have to be actions that are explicitly requested for. They both agree though it would be a moral obligation to be appreciative when a favor is done for you.

So the problem becomes, what is the definition of a favor? I agree with Li in the sense that not all favors have to be specifically requested for. When giving examples Li mentioned more urgent and larger scale types of deeds in which much appreciation should be shown. Li challenges us to imagine the appreciation that a mother must show to the person who saves her three year old from drowning in a pond. Even though there was no request for help, the mother who does not show appreciation for that “favor” would simply be lacking moral character (Li 344). This contrasts to the examples that English mentioned where Max was told to take in the mail while the neighbor was out of town. Anything additional thing that Max would do would not be considered a favor though. The scale of the action done by Max as compared to the scale of continually looking after a child is completely different. I would think that everyone would agree that the care for a child requires total urgency. There is not one day in which the child can go on his or her own without the help of the parents. When a child gains strength on his or her own and has full capability then he or she ought to show appreciation for the efforts of the parents. The duty that is towards parents is to take care of them and to show good character to them. This means that the appreciation shown is not necessarily obliging by every command because you are in some sort of debt but because of love for the favor the mother has done in order for you to get to your current standing. 

That Which We Call Duty

I personally feel that Chenyang Li’s is much stronger because he considers the “friendship” between parents and their children to be less of a reason as to why children should take care of their parents when they get older. Jane English’s argument for when it is necessary or where there is a moral obligation for children to take care of their parents is almost contingent on this friendship, or relationship with their parents. I think that children wanting to take care of their parents, as Chenyang Li says, should be out of duty (or categorical imperative even).

One of the reasons why I think that using the strength of friendship between parents and their children is not a good enough argument is because this kind of friendship is not very easily attainable. In fact, I think that having a good relationship with your children is extremely tricky because everyone is different. Even though parents have a large influence over their children’s morals and their upbringing, there is no sure way for parents to ever raise kids in such a way that they will definitely be friends in the future, let alone best friends. Already as it is, all of us in a lot of ways cannot be friends with everyone, I think that this applies as well for parents and their children (what if your kid’s an ass?). Because of the all the external environmental factors (how well the government provides for its citizens), difference in generation, change in culture (immigrant parents and their first generation American children), it is difficult for parents to have this kind of relationship with their children. Balance between spending time with their children while ensuring that their family is financially stable is difficult to strike. Perhaps having a really good relationship with your children is not quite worth compromising their future. I think that a good relationship with your children should be considered more of a luxury than a requirement.

I feel like Jane English uses this idea of friendship as a gauge to see how good a parent a person is, but I think that good parenting shouldn’t always be shown through the strength of their relationship, but perhaps how well their kid flourishes. For example, a good parent might be one who spends very little time with his children, but all of his time earning money to support his children, sending them to the best schools, getting the best food, and providing them with all the means to succeed in life, thus sacrificing the possibility that he could have the best relationship with his children. This parent is essentially sacrificing all of his time and effort, for his children, with whom he is not really close to. While this example may be a little extreme, I think it shows that friendship between parents and their children do not necessarily show good parenting. Because of this, using this as a means to gauge whether or not you should take care of your parents doesn’t work.

At the same time, this friendship between parents and children also suggest that for children to feel obligated to take care of their parents in the future, parents need to have been good parents. This is yet another problem because it is also not very easy to be a good parent. As children are born, they don’t come with manuals, and parents will never really ever know which decisions are the right ones. Parents may have all of the best intentions, but the decisions coming from these intentions may not necessarily reap the best benefits for their children. A lot of the time “bad parents” are the ones who just don’t know any better, or didn’t have the means to learn to be better. Good parenting is so subjective, that to decide whether or not your kid owes it to you to take care of you based on your parenting skills is unfair.  In addition to that, should how much you give back to your parents be measured based on how much they've given you, and if so, how do you quantify that? Because what they may have thought was best for you, may not necessarily be what you think is best for yourself, and there is no way either party will ever know that early enough. 

The Debt of Love

I agree with Jane English’s thoughts on parents’ relationships with their adult children. In her essay, she writes that adult children do not have a debt to their parents merely because of the sacrifices the parents made in raising them as a child. An incurred debt or obligation has a business connotation to it that a consumer and producer might have. If I tell my neighbor I will cut his hedges for twenty dollars, he will be in debt to me twenty dollars when the job is finished. The typical parent/adult child relationship is not structured like this and does not operate in this manner. The way in which a parent/adult child relationship should operate is on love. Love has many different qualities, but I want to touch briefly on the aspect of mutual well-being. When two people are truly in love with each other, both sides desire the well-being of the respective person for the sake of that person. In other words, I want the person I love to be in a state of well-being for his or her sake, not for my own ambitions. This is what separates the parent/adult child relationship from a business relationship. Both can potentially look the same from the outside, but are motivated by completely different ambitions under the surface. If I live reasonably close to my elderly father, I might trim his hedges because I know he can’t do it anymore and I love him. My father, knowing it is still time out of my day and a little bit of gasoline to get there might give me twenty dollars anyways because he loves me. In both the business and the family scenario, a hedge gets trimmed and the person who trimmed it gets twenty dollars, but the essence of the transaction is completely different. It is on this loving foundation that Jane English says adult children and parents should interact with each other. Children don’t owe their parents but rather should love them. 

Blog 7

In Children’s Filial Obligation, Chenyang Li argues that morally a filial obligation exists between child and parent. Li also opposes Jane English’s view that children do not owe parent’s anything because they did not ask to be born. Li argues that giving life to and raising a child is a great favor to a person, whether the person wanted to be born or not and if the person is not grateful of such favor then he or she has a weak moral consciousness. The issue of adoption is one that Li never touches in his argument that English does to an extent. English states that if a child feels no relationship to a parent then they should not have to care for that parent. This insinuates that a child put up for adoption should not have to care for its biological parents since there is no friendship or relationship formed. Also, if a child feels a friendship to his or her adoptive parents, they are morally inclined to care for them.

Li never specifies his beliefs on this issue, however he does state that “the greatest favor a person has ever received is from his parents, their giving him birth and bringing him up” (344). This strikes a problem in the case of adoption where the parents that birth the child differ from the ones that raise that child. One could assume that the biological parents give up this filial duty when they give up their child, however Li states that “a normal person appreciates the fact that he has a life… between being born and not being born a normal person would strongly prefer the former” (344). If this is true, Li believes, that a person owes his parent for giving them life and not aborting them despite what happens after birth. Does this then mean that the child has split filial obligation to the birth parents for giving the child life and the adoptive parents for sacrificing to raise the child? If so, is there one set of parent that holds more weight of that duty and what determines if the child has that duty to one set of parents over the other? I believe this issue needs to be expanded on in Li’s argument in order to make it more stronger.

Filial Obligation

In Chengyang Li’s “Grown Children’s Filial Obligation”, he claims that children are bound by duty to assist their parents as they grow old. He disagrees with Jane English’s claim that favors do not require reciprocation if they are not requested in advance. Chengyang Li uses the example of a person, Al, saving a drowning child, and says that in this case the parent of the saved child, Barbara, would have a moral obligation to repay the person who saved the child. However, this example does not completely relate to the question of filial obligation. It seems somewhat obvious that a person is morally obligated to not allow a person to die if they can help it. A parent would be obligated to not allow their child to starve, or to allow an infant to die due to neglect. This kind of obligation is not limited to a parent/child relationship, however. It extends to all relationships. Al’s obligation to save a drowning child would not be caused by his relationship with the child, as the obligation would still stand even if they had never met. If Al needed a similar kind of assistance that Barbara could give, she would not be obligated by a debt she owed him, but by the same universal morality that influenced Al in the first place.

Similarly, a parent is obligated to not allow a child to die regardless of their parent/child relationship. Also, a child would be obligated by the same standards to not allow their parent to starve once they become too old to work. Both moral obligations exist independently of each other. Since putting their parent in a nursing home would be sufficient to prevent them from starving, it would be sufficient in fulfilling this obligation.

Any unrequested favors done beyond this minimum requirement would be supererogatory, as Jane English suggests. Chengyang Li’s argument seems to focus more on this type of favor, and he claims that these supererogatory favors are what are required to be reciprocated by filial obligation. In his response to Jane English’s piece, he excludes her example of two people, Alfred and Beatrice, who are on a date. She writes that Beatrice has no obligation to physically engage Alfred, no matter how much he pays for it. This seems to me to be a more applicable analogy. If Beatrice were led to believe that Alfred was paying merely to be friendly and if she would have refused his favor if she had known that what he expected in return, then she cannot be expected to return it. Similarly, if I were a parent, and I led my child to believe that I were doing them some sort of favor purely out of love, and then later told them they were required to perform another action in addition to loving me in return, they would not be required to perform that action, since it would be an exchange that they had never agreed to in the first place. 

Favors and Voluntary Actions

Jane English argues that a system of favors does not apply to the child parent relationship, predominately because the actions that parents undertake for their child: raising them from birth, paying their college tuition, etc etc are done under the pretense of love. In other words, each of these actions are similar to a voluntary act of kindness. Therefore, the children are under no obligation to fulfill the parent's wishes. However, suppose the child asks for the favor. There is now a written promise binding the two parties, and the child is expected to fulfill his or her end of the bargain as well. Therefore in the case of paying for tuition, the parents may refuse to pay under the idea that they hope that their child will be able to become independent and pay for his or her own education. Then if the child were to ask for a favor of paying for the tuition, and the parents were to accept, would this not give the parents a say in what the child is studying? I would imagine that many of the interactions between parents and children resemble the above scenario. Suppose for example a child asks their parents to buy them a toy. This then gives them the obligation to repay their parents with something of similar or equal value. This could take the form of taking piano lessons or something similar. It was quite true that children are free to determine their destinies. However at the same time they oftentimes engage in such promises that give them an obligation to listen to their parents more.

Grown children helping parents? Yes or no? Along with other connections from the readings

Li says, "Grown children are morally obligated to help their aged parents, regardless of any situation the child is in." This is essentially what he is saying. I'll make a point about why later.

English says, "Grown children are not morally obligated to help their aged parents, and should only help them if the grown children have a love and friendship with their parents."

(English is mainly referred to her main idea above, and to her long examples in this blog.)


First off, I mainly agree with English. Many points she brought up were fantastically accurate to my beliefs and logic.One atrocious point Li made that I wholeheartedly disagree with was "What if grown children do not make enough money to support their aged parents" (Li 345). His response was baffling and completely out of line. "Have not people found themselves with fewer rooms in their house than children in the family? Have not people found their budget is tight because they have more children than their money can adequately support? Yes, of course they have" (Li 345), this to me is insinuating that if grown children enduring these already pressing hardships, that they should be able to care for their parents as well seeing that they are already putting up with other hardships similar. Why? Li makes numerous assumptions to back up that we are clearly forever and ever in debt to our parents for giving us life, but there's a BREAKING POINT. A grown child needs to focus on his INITIAL dependents. A grown child should NOT go broke trying to assist their aged parents. This is asking for entirely too much if you have other factors that direly need your support, and were there first! Just raw thoughts being put down after I read this section:

Me: What if we have issues, financially or other means that could hinder your dependents to the point of severe financial issues?

Li: YOU CAN MAKE IT WORK. You may be short on cash, but you can make it work. You can. You just can. You must, it's your duty. You'll finally know a portion of hardship that your parents dealt with.

Me: BUT WHAT IF WE TRULY CANT, are you only going to say yea you still can! Im already experiencing this hardship with my kids!! What if I go under by supporting my dependents (Wife, kids) and have no choice, but to support these dependents only, and have done this many years before my aged parents required assistance? There are clearly issues with this "duty" of ours!!

I believe this was one of the worst points he tried to justify in his writing. Sure Mom and Dad, I'll help you out and make myself and my family suffer into possible bankruptcy to support you. English makes the most logical example one could in such a situation. First there are parents who have two kids and these parents have equal love towards each. One child had to be taken care more of due to illness and this kid also got into a lot of trouble with the law. The other kid wasn't a problem child. They are both loved equally and as one would predict the problem child was poor and somehow living far away from her parents and the tame child was a wealthy lawyer living close to her parents. Logically, who should help their parents? The conditions of love and friendship are felt between all parties. One would logically suggest that the Grown child who is a lawyer help their parents for: They have love and friendship with them, are wealthy enough to do so, and live closer. Li would require the problem child who is far away and already broke to assist as well. That is insane, that is asinine! This is as clear as an example as one could make for such a situation. When things meld together, as in the children are middle class and living close to their parents, both should help as long as nothing is immensely injuring either.



As for why we are forever obligated to assist our parents, Li says we are supposed to because they sacrificed a lot for us and we can never pay them back. I'm not denying this, but it isn't entirely sound when compared to English. He comes off as we are just forever and ever devoted our parents because of the sacrifices they made for us during childhood. It is true we didn't ask for it, why are we obligated to it? He is basing this obligation off of the assumptions that we so deeply appreciate what was done for us when we realize it and so we must return the favor even though there are people who do not appreciate anything their parents may have done for them. This ties into English's argument that what if a Grown child feels no love or friendship towards their parent? They shouldn't be obligated to help them. Why would you feel obligated to help someone who is despised, or not at all appreciated in your eye? Sure, it's a cold answer, but it is true. This is attempted and I think successfully backup by many examples of people helping out other people in English's article. Our parents sacrificed a lot for us to try to connect a bond between us, this being friendship and love. When this bond grows stronger than the hardness of a diamond, you know your grown child will do whatever they can to help you back. What if it is weaker than a baby, or not even existent? What's the point of helping? Because they sacrificed a lot for us Li would reply. They don't deserve our help out of obligation, but more possibly out of general kindness if we make the decision. English made an example of neighbor A going on vacation and neighbor B mowing his lawn for the 2 weeks he is gone. It was a favor in hopes of creating a friendship. Neighbor B would not be obligated to help back to something of the same extent unless he had the same intentions. I am in huge agreement with much of what English has to say about family morality, because some of these examples actually make sense where Li is just saying you are obligated in this case and that case. A favor requires a favor in return even if you didn't ask for it. This is hard to deny, but I am going to anyways because Li somewhat ignores the intentions behind the favor and look at more about the action itself. This person sacrificed his time and gave effort doing this without you asking him, so you must do the same because he sacrificed. I am so on the fence with Li, I am a generally helpful person if put in such a situation and I most likely would help my neighbor if they did this for me, but English explains it more logically in my opinion so I feel more incline to agree with her opinion. I feel like I am coming off as rude, incredibly cold, and insensible denying Li. I feel guilty denying Li. I am incredibly perturbed by this. His system could possibly have a lot of support thanks to guilt, but in the end I'll stick with English.

Obligations to Parents

In Jane English’s excerpt from What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents?, she includes a section focusing specifically on “Parents and Children”. In this section she argues that the extent to which a child “owes” their parents depends on the level of friendship between the child and his/her parents. English feels that if a person has a strong friendship with their parents and is well off, financially for example, that child has an obligation to help his/her parents; however, if the individual is not well off, and/or does not have a strong relationship with their parents, they do not have an obligation to help his/her parents, no matter how much the parents had done for them when the individual was a child. It seems that in this sense, English makes a very good argument, and I personally agree with her.

 Although, as English states, “owe” seems to be the wrong word to describe the obligation towards one’s parents, it would make sense that if a strong relationship between an individual and their parents is present, that individual would naturally feel an obligation to help his/her parents. To contrast the obligation one would seem to naturally feel if they were close and had a good friendship with their parents, it also is the case that if one did not have a good relationship with their parents that individual would feel no obligation to help their parents, thus not “owing” them anything. The best example that comes to mind is the way that a child was treated when he/she was growing up. If a child grew up in a loving, respectful home with a close relationship to their parents, when the child grows up and a time comes that his/her parents are in need of help, that child would think of all the good things that his/her parents had done for them in the past and feel an obligation to help the parents. If the child has the means to, the child will definitely feel that obligation and will most likely aid their parents; however, even if an individual did not have the means to aid their parents, it would seem that they still feel an obligation to their parents and may even search for alternative ways to go about helping their parents. Contrasting that, if a child were to have grown up in a home that was, for example, abusive and unloving, that child would not develop a strong friendship with his/her parents, and thus would not feel an obligation to them when a time came that they were then in need. If this time were to come, the individual in question would seemingly think back to the past and the negativity that was presented during childhood, as well as the lack of good relationship or friendship between themselves and their parents, and feel absolutely no obligation towards their parents due to the lack of positivity while growing up.

The friendship between child and parent does not necessarily have to be during childhood, as English points out, but it can also be gained or lost as the individual grows as a person. If parents were there for an individual during childhood, but have a falling out and are not there for the individual for years, when the parents were in need the child would also feel no obligation to help them. On the other hand, if parents were not there for an individual during childhood, yet make an appearance and end up staying in the individual’s life while forming a close friendship, that individual may feel obligation to help them when a time comes that they are in need. 

Children's Filial Obligation

Chenyang Li discusses grown children’s filial obligation to take care of their parents. I agree to Li’s beginning points about the importance of the relationship between adult children and their elderly parents and how that importance is based off of morality.  However, I disagree with the Confucian view about taking care of the old over the rest of the family. In the Confucian view “a person’s filial duty is not only to serve his or her aged parents, but also to do the best to serve them well. (pg 343)”.  Li used the Confucian example about the child serving his parents the best possible options, even though they did not have those options for himself and his family. For example, the child would serve his parents meat and wine. Also, to ensure the parents got enough food they were served before the rest of the family. I do not think anyone can disagree with the point that parents should be cared for, however I do not think they should be put before the rest of the family including children.  A child’s early years are very important for proper development, which means they need proper diet, exercise, etc. I think the children should be put first. Children will not develop and live long prosperous lives without proper development.  I do not think that an elderly person’s life is meaningless; however, for the most part they have lived long prosperous lives and have developed to their maximum capacity. Overall, I agree with the idea that parents should be cared for by their kin, however I do not think all the logistics are well-thought out enough. 

Criticism of Li's Argument

At the risk of sounding ethnocentric, I have several critiques of Li’s Confucian arguments about what adults owe their parents, and agree more with English’s argument.  I definitely have ideas developed unconsciously through living in the United States.  I do not deny that family values are different depending on the culture individuals were raised under.  That being said, I find serious flaws in Li’s argument as prescribed to the entire world.  Family values in China are often very strong, and the culture of respect is quite different than it is in other countries.  Though this should not be important to the ethics of what adults owe to their parents, it very much is. 

Li explains that family obligation extends to children regardless of their love for their parents.  My first objection to Li is his narrow amount of cases he provides.  He does not regard cases where the family is entirely neglectful of their child.   This can happen in many ways.  If one extends the definition of “parenting” or “raising a child” to an international degree, it is challenging to establish a concrete meaning and level of rules for doing so.  Li considers the culture of China, but does not consider the applications in other cultures with different traditions and expectations.  This in itself can be argued as ethnocentric.  Li projects the notion that parents always (or at least often) raise, protect, and sacrifice for their children, when in reality it is untrue.  This premise is false, which weakens Li’s argument that children owe something to their parents.  Li does not account for the parents who refuse any responsibility for their children.  What about the parent who abuses, does not feed enough to, or emotionally abuses their children?  What if a parent does not care for their child when they are sick? They have developed a weak responsibility to their children.  Children cannot owe care and positive attention to those who have treated them so negatively.  In fact, under Li’s logic, they would owe their parents the treatment they were given.  Li argues that since one’s parents raised them and sacrificed for them, they owe the same respect, but fails to account for parents who neglect their children.  He neglects to mention when exactly it becomes necessary to care for one’s parents.  At what point are parents old and sick enough to need care?  He also neglects to address the case where the parents refuse help.

Blog Post 7

Chenyang Li makes the assumption that grown children's parents would be happier if they stayed at home with their children.  I believe this is quite a leap.  Extreme cases such as elderly abuse clearly show that living at home may not always be a good thing.  Taking care of their parents also adds a financial strain on their grown children.  They may not be able to financially provide for their parents as well as they should.  The state may have the available resources in a home to care for these elderly people that their children simply do not.  Parents may also feel guilty for making their children take care of them, not making them happier. It is pointed out that the Chinese value respecting the old, however, overall abuse rates of the Asian elderly range all the way up to 44%.  I would also argue that in cases of children who have dealt with child abuse, they have no obligation to their parents when they are grown.

Small favors are chump change

Jane English, in her "What Children Owe Parents," is careful to make a distinction between what a child owes a parent and what a child ought to do for a parent. English discards the notion of "owing" as inappropriate for a filial relationship. Favors done by parents shouldn't be thought of as investments to be cashed in later, but rather as creating and deepening relationships. There is no debt to be repaid by a daughter to her parents for raising and caring for her. English clarifies that filial obligation is rooted in love and relationships, rather than in an accounting of favors. And English does believe that filial obligation exists, but that it begins and ends with the filial relationship.

I am inclined to agree with English. It's not difficult to envision a situation in which a child has been accorded many "favors" over the years by his parents. Later in life, the parents call in these favors. Even if the child were to have fallen out with his parents, he would be obligated to return each and every favor he received from his parents, perhaps including the very gift of life. It would not be reasonable to expect this child to lay down his life for the parents he no longer had a relationship with merely on the basis that his parents were the ones who gave him that life in the first place. It would be equally unreasonable to expect him to repay the favors of his upbringing with donations of organs or blood plasma. I agree with English; in such a case the child's obligation is the same as that of any person to a stranger. It makes more sense to consider filial obligation from the framework of relationships. These favors of giving life and upbringing are not favors at all, but rather work to establish a relationship with the child. If this loving relationship is maintained, the child is left with a moral responsibility as a member of this mutual loving relationship to provide aid to his parents. But the relationship is absolutely key; if it is dissolved, so too is all filial obligation.

Defining Parenthood and Its Relation To What Children Owe Parents

First, I would like to offer a definition of parenthood that pertains to what children owe their parents. Often we treat the words, "parent," "father," and "mother" in a narrow biological and legal sense. In the narrow sense, being a parent means you are either a father or a mother; father and mother refer to a specific gender (male and female) who has biologically helped conceive the child and/or has legal custody of the child. I use "and/or" in the previous sentence as we often consider parents who adopt children to be the father or mother of the said child, despite no biological connection. However, I think there is a somewhat broader definition that we should accept as a more proper definition of parent, father, and mother. This broader definition maintains all of the parts of the narrow sense, but includes that the biological and legal responsibilities of parent lead to a duty on behalf of the parent/father/mother that they shelter, feed, clothe, and promote the general well-being of their child.

No doubt the ambiguity contained in the statement of "general well-being" might cause worry for some (i.e. what exactly promotes general well-being?), but further fleshing out of that idea would require a much longer paper and for now I would hope that it seems a reasonable duty on the part of the parent. Others might question the purpose the added requirement to fulfill the definition of being parent/mother/father (i.e. what does this definition give us that the narrow sense does not?). I argue that this is important because a true parent cannot simply be contained in a biological and legal sense. This point is very much in line with Jane English's point that parents want to foster a sense of love and friendship between themselves and their child. It is not enough for a parent to merely birth or aid the conception of a child, they have merely met the biological requirements of being a parent. This seems to agree somewhat with our intuitions: If a parent does not care for the child in a way that fosters a sense of love and friendship, such as a parent who physically abuses their child, we think of them as a bad parent. However, instead of merely thinking of them as a "bad parent" we should think of them as a person who has failed to meet the requirements of being a successful parent. Our language does not have a word for such a type of person, so we have to describe them as a bad parent, but I think it is more accurate to describe the failure to complete this duty as a failure to be a parent.

So, if we accept the broader definition of parent/mother/father, what impact does that have on what children owe their parents? I believe this ends up supporting Jane English's conclusion: the parent has merely fulfilled their duty as a parent and the child does not owe anything to the parent. Some might want to argue that the child holds a similar duty to the parent, but I do not think this is true as the biological and legal factors that create the duty for the parents are not present with a child. This tracks with English's argument that the child did not ask to be created, so there is no reciprocal duty. However, I would hope that a child would respect the love and friendship created by parent who has fulfilled their duty (and subsequently, matches the broader definition of being a parent). In other words, it is rather blameworthy of a child to not respect their parents who have fulfilled their duty by taking care of them, but there is no moral requirement that a child do so.

family morality

            Chenyang Li argues that grown children have filial obligation to their parents because their relationship is more than that of friends and love. He thinks that children should repay the early sacrifices by their parents. I disagree with his argument.

He fails to consider happiness of aged parents and grown up children. Will the parents want to be taken care of by their children if they know that their children are not happy? Children may not be happy due to a financial problem, or due to the unloved relationship they have with their parents. Li says that even in these situations, children have filial obligation to their parents. However, in such a situation, both parents and children may not be happy. Even if parents and children love each other, parents may feel guilty or even shame if they know that they are causing a financial problem to their children. Children with financial problem may face various difficulties and not be able to have good relationships with their children, causing another problem.

If aged parents and grown children do not love each other, then how can children be happy helping parents and how can parents be happy being helped by someone who they do not love? Children may feel some kind of happiness, or superiority by the act of helping, but this seems unrelated to filial obligation and more of doing a favor. Some may think that parents will be happy since they are getting help and potentially living a better life. However, do such parents deserve to be helped? Parents and children have special bonds between them that tend to create loving relationships. In order for the relationship to go wrong between them, something significant must happen. If parents do not feel any guilt or shame from the past events and are still getting help from children, I do not think they are moral and do not deserve filial obligation from their children. 

Blog Post 7

If you choose to post by Wednesday night by 11:00 PM, either (a) raise and develop an objection to something in the family morality readings, OR (b) offer and develop a supporting argument for something in the family morality readings.

Sex and flourishing

            I am attracted to Scruton’s Aristotelian approach of sexual morality because, like Hursthouse’s argument concerning the morality of abortion, it offers a way to discuss the issue without necessarily being concerned about rights or absolutes, but being more concerned with how it relates to human flourishing.

            I think I agree with the general idea that sex is not something that means nothing and that it should be taken seriously.  I also think that most people agree with this as well, even if they claim they do not.  If sex really were something that were totally devoid of any morality or, at least, a type of reasoning that should guide a person’s proper behavior concerning it, it seems to me that seeing someone after a one-night stand should not be awkward.  It’s not awkward to see someone with whom one shook hands the night before, after all.  What makes the morning after awkward is that the two people involved had done something intimate when the actual emotional intimacy that should be involved is not there.  It seems similar to the awkwardness that exists between people who were once friends that results from the lack of intimacy despite their history of having done intimate things together.

            Furthermore, the fact that rape is a serious issue for anyone also seems to reveal that sex is something important that should be taken seriously.  Again, if someone forcibly shook hands with another person, it seems unlikely that the same distress involved with rape would exist; sex clearly isn't simply a physical act, but rather something closely tied to identity and something that holds meaning.   And as all similarly serious issues should, sex has an associated morality or at least a guideline for how to approach it to achieve flourishing.

            Ultimately, while I do not think that there are strict rules concerning the way one approaches sex, it seems that sex has more importance and is more tied to human flourishing than people often assume.  Thus, I agree with Scruton’s view that people would flourish more if they are able to recognize and maintain their sexual integrity (although I’m not sure if I agree that the “harmless wanker with the video-machine can at any moment turn into the desperate rapist with a gun”.)

Sexual Morality

Although I do not necessarily support Goldman’s views regarding sex and morality, I think that overall, his beliefs are supported by generally sound arguments. However, I have one major objection to the piece which I think have caused me to have an overall dislike of his idea that sex is independent of moral implications. My objection involves the authors attempt to distinguish sexual relationships from love based relationships using unfounded opinions to assign value to each relation. The author asserts that there is a higher value on love than sexual relationships. On page 234, the author says “although intense, the pleasures of sex are brief and repetitive rather than cumulative. They give value to the specific acts which generate them, but not the lasting kind of value which enhances one’s life…by contrast, love typically develops over a long term relation; while its pleasure may be less intense and physical, they are more cumulative in value”. I disagree with this statement because the author fails to recognize the many positive physical and biochemical benefits that sex has on both men and woman. For example, sex is scientifically proven to reduce blood pressure, stress, and the risk of prostate cancer in men. Thus, someone having “brief and repetitive” sex (independent of romantic love) will have cumulative health benefits. I would argue that these health benefits are valuable because all are obviously related to overall health and longevity which are unarguably connected to overall happiness. The authors support is purely opinionated for this particular argument.

The Ability to Choose: Fidelity and Double Standards

          While I agree to Scruton’s more traditional view on sexual morality, it fails to thoroughly explain to what degree fidelity is important to the double standard that exists in many cultures between females and males concerning the ability to choose sexual partners. According to Scruton,

“The personal and the sexual can become divorced in many ways. The task of sexual morality is to unite them, to sustain thereby the intentionality of desire, and to prepare the individual for exotic love. Sexual morality is the morality of embodiment…”  -Scruton

        This tells me that there are divides that sexual morality helps bring together by means of intentional desire which prepares the individual for exotic love; all of which is meant to morally unite the individual and their body. This seems to assume that every person is able to choose their desired partner freely without stigmatization. If one can not choose a desired partner and is with one whom is undesirable how can that person fulfill this moral embodiment? Many cultures tend to have arranged marriages, polygamy, and divorcing stigmas in which this double standard and the idea of fidelity come into play. There are arranged marriages, for example, where the couple is forced into wedlock and sometimes they are lucky and the arrangement turns out well where both parties desire each other. However is it morally permissible to still have sex in a case where only one feels desire or neither desire one another? Does their sex then become immoral if they are having sex without the desire for one another thus unable to obtain the ability to unite with their own bodies, or is it more immoral to choose against fidelity and seek other partners?   Other situations include polygamy where males are more popularly known to be the partner that has many wives. Additionally, males are often seen with the power to pick and choose whom they desire. Here stands the double standard between males and females where the woman is unable to decide to increase and /or choose her desired partners without being stigmatized for it. Examples of this can occur if the man who was arranged to be married to the woman whom he has no desire for, decides later to get a divorce. In many cultures this is not looked down upon, but as soon as a female chooses to do this, she is scrutinized for her actions and her inability to make it work.            

     Because Scruton barely touched on this subject and the relationship between fidelity and the double standard among males and females, I cannot predict his argument for this. He may argue against and say that virtue is a matter of degree and a virtuous person must find to what degree their action is virtuous. In which case I would argue back that this makes the double standard morally permissible in itself where the degree of which one is virtuous is different for a female than for a male. Or he could argue for the female and say that there should be no reason to look down upon her if “the prime focus of sexual morality is not the attitude of others but the attitude to one’s own body and its uses”- Scruton.   In which case I would agree but, overall his more traditional view on sexual morality fails to thoroughly explain to what degree fidelity is important to the double standard that exists in many cultures between females and males concerning the ability to choose sexual partners.