Although I do think there exists some argument for why torture may be permissible, I want to address the article "A Case for Torture" and how it makes a poor argument against those who oppose torture.
I will mainly argue that Bagaric's hostage-kidnap analogy is a poor one.
He describes the analogy as follows:
"The
reason that torture in such a case is defensible and necessary is because the
justification manifests from the closest thing we have to an inviolable right:
the right to self-defence, which of course extends to the defence of another...The analogy with self-defence is
sharpened by considering the hostage-taking scenario, where a wrongdoer takes a
hostage and points a gun to the hostage's head, threatening to kill the hostage
unless a certain (unreasonable) demand is met. In such a case it is not only
permissible, but desirable for police to shoot (and kill) the wrongdoer if they
get a "clear shot"...There is no logical or moral difference
between this scenario and one where there is overwhelming evidence that a
wrongdoer has kidnapped an innocent person and informs police that the victim
will be killed by a co-offender if certain demands are not met. In the hostage scenario, it is universally
accepted that it is permissible to violate the right to life of the aggressor
to save an innocent person. How can it be wrong to violate an even less
important right (the right to physical integrity) by torturing the aggressor in
order to save a life in the second scenario?"
First, I believe he is wrong in saying that the inviolable right of self-defense "of course extends to defense of another." It seems arguable that morality permits to you to harm another person when that person is threatening to hurt you for reasons that do not extend to defending someone else. Many arguments for self defense hinge on the idea that we have a responsibility/connection/right to ourselves, our own bodies/life/well-being that enables us to put ourselves before others. If this is one's argument for self-defense, it wouldn't make sense to say we can extend that right to mean we have the right to defend others. Bagaric needs to provide an argument for why the right to defend ourselves implies a right to defend others.
Second, I believe the example of a kidnapper holding a gun to a hostages head is dis-analogous to most hostage situations. In the example, the danger is tremendously clear and imminent. Without any question/doubt whatsoever, the police man can tell who is/will be the victim, who is/will be the perpetrator and that there are presumable minutes, if not seconds, before his lack of action could result in death. In most cases of torture, the potential victims, perpetrators, moment of how and when the danger will occur and is unclear. That's why the torture is happening in the first place. This lack of knowledge I think is morally relevent in differentiating between the two scenarios and whether or not it is permissible to act. Furthermore, it seems dis-analogous to suggest that the man holding the gun up the the hostage is morally equivalent to the subject of torture. When being held captive and tortured, it is likely that the torturee is aware of or previously involved in the potential crime/attack/danger but at that moment they are not the ones actively carrying out the harm the way the man with the gun is. Knowledge that harm is going to occur does not rid you of the right to not be harmed the same way holding someone at gunpoint does.
Lastly,
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