The Importance of Dehumanization

In his article, "A case for torture," Mirko Bagaric argues that torture is permissible in some circumstances. One counterargument that Bagaric addresses is the claim that torture dehumanizes society. I will argue that Bagaric does not take this rejoinder seriously enough and seems to poorly interpret the implications of the rejoinder.

The specific quote from Bagaric concerning dehumanization is, "The second main argument is that torture will dehumanise society... A society that elects to favour the interests of wrongdoers over those of the innocent, when a choice must be made between the two, is in need of serious ethical rewiring" ("A case for torture" 2-3). Bagaric argues that torture in order to save an innocent is essentially an act of self-defense. Torture, even in the case to save an innocent, differs in an important way from self-defense in the type of harm. Intentionally inflicting pain on someone, whether to gain information or as a form of punishment, is an entirely different harm from killing the hostage taker in Bagaric's example. I don't want to get into the business of judging what moral harms are worse than others, that seems mathematical in a way that doesn't apply to morality, but I think it is enough to say the harms are very different. The situations are also importantly different in that there is an exigency and clarity in the hostage taker rather than a situation where torture is necessary to save someone.

There are some harms that violate rights that people cannot lose no matter what actions they have committed. People have a right to not have severe pain intentionally inflicted upon them and this right cannot be surrendered simply by being a criminal or by breaking a moral rule. In other words, to possess the right against torture is a right we have by being human; to torture someone is to disrespect their humanity in this way. This is the main claim of the dehumanization counterargument. Torture disrespects the humanity of the tortured such that the torturer no longer treats their victim as a human. Any society that permits torture in this way allows for dehumanization to occur and any society that permits dehumanization dehumanizes itself in way that unreasonably places it's rules above the rights of humans.

The latter half of that quote is a rather radical claim concerning the implications of the dehumanization rejoinder. Bagaric is arguing that if we prohibit torture as an option in order to save an innocent person's life, then we are placing the interests of wrongdoers over the interests (the lives) of the innocent. I argue that Bagaric is interpreting the prohibition of torture backwards here. This is not a case of favor, this is a case of respecting humanity and the rights of humans regardless of their actions. The wrongdoer may have violated the right of the innocent, but that does not mean that wrongdoer automatically loses their rights too. The wrongdoer is a human and there are some rights that have special status such that they cannot be lost despite the actions of the wrongdoer.