End-of-Life

In Scott Stonington and Pinit Ratanakul’s “Is There a Global Bioethics? End-of-Life in Thailand and the Case for Local Difference”, the authors present an example in which a patient, Gaew, lacks brain activity and is dependent on a ventilator. Both Dr. Nok and Gaew’s brother Lek do not feel that they can remove Gaew from the ventilator, because Buddhist teachings strictly prohibit the destruction of life. They decide instead that Lek should become ordained as a monk, and then this may appease Gaew, and then he will allow himself to die. However, in doing this, his goal would still be for Gaew’s life to be ended. While this act would be indirect, and more allowing Gaew to die instead of actually killing him, the same could be said of unplugging Gaew’s ventilator. Gaew’s attachment to his desire to become a monk ties him to life in a similar way that the ventilator physically ties him to life. In both scenarios, Lek would be purposefully attempting to remove something that is keeping Gaew alive. Therefore, it would seem that if unplugging the ventilator would be prohibited, then becoming ordained specifically to persuade Gaew to allow himself to die must also be prohibited.